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ESTATE TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE DEATH BENEFITS
EMPLOYEE death benefits constitute a comparatively recent compensation
technique which combines production incentive with social security.Y Geared
to the needs of individual businesses, these plans take a variety of forms differ-
ing significantly in manner of payment and method of financing.2 Such plans
range in scale from the giant union-bargained package benefiting thousands of
employees in a single industry to smaller arrangements designed primarily to
reward corporate executives and other key employees.3 For complete success,
plans of the latter type must be carefully attuned to the subtleties of estate
taxation, since executives and other high income employees will normally face
the incidence of a death tax.4
1. Employee death benefits are generally an integral part of retirement income or pen-
sion plans. For the history, development and purposes of such plans, see, generally, DEAR-
ING, INDUSTRIAL PENSIONS 1-19 (1954) (hereinafter cited as DEARING) ; O'NEILL, MODERN
PENSION PLANS 1-47 (1947) (hereinafter cited as O'NEILL) ; WYATT, BJoRN, WILLIAMSON,
BnoNsoN, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 1-12 (1945) (hereinafter cited as WYATT).
2. Death benefits are a peculiarly personal type of compensation, and plans are often
flexibly arranged to suit the needs of individual employees. For example, one employee
may wish his beneficiary to receive a lump sum payment, while another would prefer a
survivorship annuity with installment payments. Individualizing features are numerous;
for discussion of the many options available, see Beck, Family Benefits and Family
Security: Employee Death Payments, N.Y.U. 13TI INsT. ON FED. TAX. 471 (1955);
Yohlin, Employer Payments to the Widow of a Deceased Employee, 34 TAXES 87 (1956).
As the text reveals passim, the exact features chosen, however, may have widely differing
estate tax consequences.
Moreover, the employer may choose from several methods of administering his plan.
He may purchase formal contracts from insurance companies, establish a trust fund with-
out the facilities of a professional insurer or contract informally with his employees with-
out setting aside special funds. And other alternatives are available. On the general prob-
lems of creating and implementing death benefit plans, see Colgan, How to Provide Death
Benefits Before and After Retirement, N.Y.U. 12 TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 391 (1954) ;
Nelson, The New ,55,000 Death Benefit, 31 TAXES 629 (1953). See also Beck, supra;
Yohlin, supra. The precise method which the employer chooses may significantly affect his
employees' estate tax liabilities.
3. For examples of union-negotiated death benefits, see 2 BNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
Tiu, NECOTIATIONs AND CONTRAcTs 44:337 (1956), 53:619 (1955).
For discussion of death benefits paid executives and other key employees, see Allison,
Deferred Compensation of Executives, 1954 TuL. TAX INST. 105; Bilder, Death Benefits
Paid Under an Express Contract, 34 TAXES 529 (1956) ; Childs, Deferred Compensation
Plans for Executives, 31 TAXES 1007 (1953) ; Diamond, Tax Aspects of Nonqualified Pen-
sion and Deferred Payment Plans, 32 TAXES 615 (1954) ; Lefevre, Deferred Compensation
Plans, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1081 (1957) ; Long, Deferred Compensation for
Executives, 24 TENN. L. REv. 285 (1956) ; Rice, Incentives for Executives of Small Cor-
porations, 32 TAxES 222 (1954).
4. These employees may expect to have gross estates the value of which will exceed
the minimal estate tax exemptions. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2052, 2056; note 20
infra. A major purpose of death benefit plans in this context is avoidance of high income
tax rates by deferred compensation. However, unless estate tax consequences are antici-
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Before the 1954 Code, estate taxation of employee death benefits derived
from a maze of individual provisions each differing in history and impact.,
Often conflicting in the type of liability imposed, and sometimes overlapping
in scope, these provisions reached property interests of a general testamentary
character with varying effect. Designed to mark the broad outlines of the estate
tax, the structure was ill-suited to the unique problems raised by employee
death benefits. As a result, taxation in this area became confused.( Often, the
precise tax consequence of any given death benefit turned upon purely formal
distinctions which made decisions unpredictable and estate planning hazardous,
if not impossible.
Against this background, the 1954 Code revision is disappointing. Although
the employee death benefit is recognized as a distinct taxable entity for the first
time,7 the Code fails to provide a uniform scheme for taxing its many forms.8
Instead, new categories have been superimposed upon old, and the entire struc-
ture retains dated terminology, ensnarled in troublesome precedent and con-
fused interpretation. And while tax consequences attending differences of ter-
minology are even more crucial than before, distinctions among various appli-
cable labels are, if anything, less precise. Thus, estate taxation of employee death
benefits remains problematical. This Comment will survey the several estate
tax provisions currently applicable to employee death benefits and suggest
methods of analysis for resolving their conflicting principles of taxation into
an administratively workable structure.9
pated, this liability may partially cancel income tax gains. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2001 (estate tax rates).
5. Under the 1939 Code, no estate tax section dealt specifically with employee death
benefits. Instead, provisions taxing "property" in general were most frequently applied to
death benefits other than insurance. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(a), 53 STAT. 120
(property in which decedent held an interest at death) ; § 811(c), as amended, 67 STAT.
623 (1953) (inter vivos property transfers of testamentary character) ; § 811(d), as
amended, 67 STAT. 623 (1953) (revocable transfers) ; § 811(f), as amended, 65 STAT. 91
(1951) (property subject to powers of appointment). Application of these provisions to
employee death benefits became mired in technical property law distinctions. See notes
60-69 infra and accompanying text.
Estate taxation of insurance benefits was a major exception to this scheme. Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 811(g), as amended, 56 STAT. 944 (1942), dealt specifically with life in-
surance. Section 811(g) included insurance proceeds in a decedent's gross estate on the
basis of his payment of premiums during life or possession of incidents of ownership at
death. This approach is altered by the 1954 Code. See note 34 infra.
6. "The greatest confusion over the tax consequences of a death benefit payment lies
in the estate tax field." Nelson, supra note 2, at 632. For a sampling of the difficulties
under the 1939 Code, see 3 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcomE, GIFrT AND ESTATE
TAXATION § 63.05(5) (1944) (hereinafter cited as RBi & JOHNSON); Young, De-
ferred Pay Plans-Qualified and Non-Qualified Plans, N.Y.U. 13TrH INST. ON FED. TAX.
457 (1955) ; text at notes 61-67 infra.
7. INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 2039; see note 22 infra.
8. For "annuities," taxation depends on § 2039. For life insurance, § 2042 is applicable.
When neither section applies, death benefits may be taxed under the varying provisions of
§8 2033-38, 2040-41, 2043.
9. Only death benefits payable in accordance with a contract or other pre-death arrange-
ment are considered; post-death gifts or other manifestations of employer generosity are
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CURRENT LABELS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Qualified plans-An Exemption
The 1954 Code encourages employers to establish retirement and death
benefits for their employees by conferring broad tax advantages upon plans
qualifying under section 401.10 This policy is carried into the estate tax by
section 2039(c) which excludes from the employee's gross estate the benefits
attributable to employer contributions to "qualified" plans." "Qualified" plans,
however, are subject to strict conditions which limit their availability. The
exemption of section 2039(c) is not obtainable unless the plan confers death
benefits upon either a substantial percentage of all employees or upon a class
of employees which does not discriminate in favor of executives or other super-
visory personnel.' 2 Even when the exemption applies, it does not reach the
omitted. Also, this Comment deals with income or gift tax implications of death benefit
plans only where critical to problems of estate taxation.
10. See note 12 infra; 1 RLBKIN & JOHNSON §§ 15.01-.05.
Several provisions of the 1954 Code implement this scheme. For example, the em-
ployer's contributions to a qualified plan, within prescribed limitations, are currently de-
ductible from income tax; excess contributions may be deducted in succeeding years. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (7). If the qualified plan is administered by means of a trust,
as is generally the case, the trust's income is also exempt from taxation in most instances.
Id. §§ 501 (a), 511-14.
Favorable tax treatment of qualified plans enures to employees and their beneficiaries
as well as employers. The major benefit given the employee is a deferment of taxable in-
come; he pays no tax until amounts are distributed or actually made available to him.
Id. § 402(a) (1). Distribution under a qualified plan may result in only capital gains taxa-
tion to the distributee. Id. §§ 402 (a) (2), 403 (a) (2). And such distribution may fall with-
in the $5,000 exemption for employee death benefits. Id. § 101(b). See, generally, Alex-
ander, Advantages and Disadvantages of Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans:
A Discussion, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1251, 1252-54 (1956).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c). The relevant portions of this provision state:
"... [T]here shall be excluded from the gross estate the value of an annuity or
other payment receivable by any beneficiary (other than the executor) under-
(1) an employees' trust . . . forming part of a pension, stock bonus, or profit-
sharing plan which . . . [meets] the requirements of section 401 (a) ; or
(2) a retirement annuity contract purchased by an employer . . . pursuant to a
plan which . . . [meets] . . . the requirement of section 401 (a) (3).
If such amounts . . . are attributable to any extent to payments or contributions
made by the decedent, no exclusion shall be allowed for that part of the value of
such amounts in the proportion that the total payments or contributions made by the
decedent bears to the total payments or contributions made. For purposes of this
subsection, contributions or payments made by the decedent's employer or former
employer under a trust or plan described in this subsection shall not be considered
to be contributed by the decedent."
See H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1957) (reporting H.R. 8381 which
would amend § 2039(c) to exempt only those annuities meeting all the requirements of
§ 401(a) instead of only § 401(a) (3) ).
12. Before § 2039(c) applies, the death benefit plan must "qualify." See INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 2039(c). For a qualified status, two alternatives are available. Under INr.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (3) (A), the plan must cover seventy per cent of all employees,
or at least eighty per cent of those eligible to benefit under the plan if at least seventy per
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benefits which reflect the employee's own out of pocket contributions to the
plan, for section 2039(c) includes in his gross estate that value which is in the
same proportion to the total benefits as the employee's contributions bear to
the total contributions. 1 3
As a practical matter, qualified plans confer relatively slight estate tax ad-
vantages. Whether or not a plan qualifies under section 401, if the benefits
provided are considered "life insurance," the exemption of section 2039(c)
does not apply. 14 The taxability of these benefits, as insurance, is determined
cent are eligible. However, in computing these percentages, employees who have not been
employed for a prescribed minimum period or whose customary employment is not more
than twenty hours weekly or five months yearly are excluded. Alternatively, the plan may
establish a classification for qualified benefits, if, but only if, such classification does not
discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisors or other highly compensated
employees. Id. § 40L(a) (3) (B). Thus, selected groups of lower-salaried employees may
be compensated by qualified plans. But under neither alternative can the contributions or
benefits provided discriminate in favor of key employees. Id. § 401(a) (4). See 1 RAimcnI
& JOHNSON § 15.05.
The plan must be for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries, and
contributions to a qualified trust must be made for the purpose of distributing corpus and
income to employees or their beneficiaries. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (1). Prior
to the satisfaction of all obligations under the plan, it must be impossible to divert the
funds to other uses. Id. § 401 (a) (2).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c) ; note 11 supra.
14. Apparently, the Code's drafters intended to make §§ 2039 and 2042 mutually ex-
clusive. For § 2039(a) is specifically not applicable to amounts receivable as "insurance
under policies on the life of the decedent." But the exemption for qualified employee death
benefits provided in § 2039(c) is stated in broad language which does not in terms dis-
tinguish between "annuities" and "insurance." And no discernible policy reason appears
for such a distinction, once a plan is qualified. See note 16 infra. Notwithstanding
the apparent breadth of § 2039(c), the regulations limit this exemption to only
those payments ordinarily within §§ 2039(a), (b). Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. §
20.2039-2(a), 21 FED. REG. 7878 (1956). Consequently, "insurance" proceeds paid under a
qualified plan are not exempt under § 2039(c), since such proceeds are ordinarily taxed
by § 2042 and not §8 2039 (a) or (b). Ibid. For the opposite view, that qualified insurance
proceeds were intended to be exempt under § 2039(c), see Cardon, Final Regulations
Clarify Rules on. Distributions Under Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 6 J. TAXATION
100, 102 (1957).
On the other hand, the Commissioner's interpretation is consistent with current income
tax treatment of insurance. The income tax provisions disfavor insurance as an integral
part of a qualified plan. Specifically, contributions by the employer to certain types of
non-forfeitable insurance coverage, even when incident to a qualified plan, must be reported
as income by the participating employee. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1 (a) (3) (1957) ;
Lawthers, The Individual Life Insurance Policy Issued in Connection with a Qualified
Employee Trust, 35 TAXES 173, 174 (1957). Given this income tax approach, it might be
argued that employer contributions to the cost of insurance are not "contributions to a
plan" within the meaning of §§ 401-04. Such contributions would consequently be attributed
to the decedent employee for purposes of § 2039(c). But § 2039(c) exempts only the em-
ployer's contributions to a qualified plan, and not the employee's. Therefore, on this view,
insurance is properly excluded from § 2039(c).
For the meaning of "insurance," see text at notes 73-82 infra. For the tax consequences
of this label, see text at notes 33-39 infra.
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by section 2042 which, according to the regulations, does not recognize an
exemption for qualified plans. 15 Employees who receive life insurance protec-
tion under qualified plans will thus lose the exemption of section 2039(c),
though the policy reasons for this result are not clear.' 6 And when a substantial
amount of insurance coverage is provided, the plan may not even qualify under
section 401.17 Moreover, since qualified plans can not discriminate in favor of
influential employees,' 8 they are too costly for use primarily in compensating
key executives.19 For benefits conferred upon the highest salaried employees
must be proportionate to those of the lowest. Yet, only the highest salaried
need ordinarily concern themselves with the estate tax; most employees will
15. The regulations specifically confine the exemption for qualified plans to death
benefits otherwise taxable under §§ 2039(a), (b). Since these subsections exclude insur-
ance, the exemption cannot, under Treasury interpretation, include insurance payments.
See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(a), 21 FED. REG. 7878 (1956) ; note 14 supra.
Section 2042 does not distinguish between qualified and non-qualified plans. To be includible
under § 2042 the benefits must only be receivable "as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent." See text at notes 33-39 infra.
16. The income tax also discriminates against insurance coverage provided by a quali-
fied plan. Employer contributions to certain types of insurance coverage are treated as
current income to the employee, U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-(1) (a) (3) (1957) ; Gordon,
Pension and Profit Sharing Plans for Medium and Small Business, 1955 TUL. TAx INST. 231,
242; Bomar, How Benefits Are Taxed to Employees, in HANDBOOK FOR PENSION PLAN-
NING 217 (1949), while income taxation of contributions to a qualified plan for purposes
other than insurance protection is ordinarily deferred until death benefits are actually re-
ceived. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (1), 403(a) (1). See, generally, Lawthers,
supra note 14.
In the estate tax, discrimination against insurance proceeds incident to a qualified plan
may be construed as merely an extension of the income tax scheme. But this justification
appears unsound, for the estate tax does not distinguish between "current" and "deferred"
tax events. Rather, the estate tax is imposed broadly upon property owned by the decedent
at death. Since legislative policy favors exempting qualified annuities from a decedent's
taxable property at death, the same policy would seem to apply when qualified insurance
proceeds are involved. See pages 1249-50 infra.
17. A plan will not qualify if the employer's contributions are solely for the purpose
of providing employees with insurance protection; a qualified status is obtainable, how-
ever, if insurance benefits are merely "incidental." U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1)
(1957) ; see also Rev. Rul. 54-67, 1954-1 Cua . BULL. 149; Gordon, supra note 16, at 241-
44. For an example of insurance benefits permissible under a qualified plan, see U.S.
Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-(1) (a) (3) (1957).
Even if insurance benefits are "incidental," most qualified plans likely to be approved
will give the employee one or more "incidents of ownership" in the policy. The proceeds
will then be subject to estate tax liability under § 2042. See Bomar, supra note 16, at 228-
30. But the employee may avoid this liability by divesting himself of control over the policy.
See text at note 38 hira. See also Rev. Rul. 54-398, 1954-2 Cumr. BULL. 239; cf. Rev. Rul.
56-656, 1956 INT. REv. BULL., No. 51, at 13.
18. See note 12 supra.
19. Young, supra note 6, at 458. However, the qualified plan can be employed to
supplement more conventional methods of compensating valued personnel. See Lefevre,
supra note 3, at 1082. In a limited number of situations involving closely held corporations
or other small enterprises, the qualified plan may be used specifically to compensate exe-
cutives. Cf. Gordon, supra note 16, at 235.
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not possess property of sufficient aggregate value to incur this liability in the
first instance.2 0 Consequently non-qualified plans will remain the major vehicle
for compensating favored employees by means of death benefits, and in this
area the estate tax plays a major role.
Annuities vs. Life Insurance
In the area of non-qualified plans, estate tax treatment of most employee
death benefits hinges upon their identification as either "annuities" or "life in-
surance" within sections 2039 and 2042 respectively. 21 Section 2039 is a com-
prehensive attempt to subject the death benefit portions of survivorship an-
nuities, or other similar contracts, to estate tax liability if during life the
decedent possessed any rights to payment, such as retirement income, under
his contract. 22 This provision includes in the gross estate the value at death of
20. Death benefits have no estate tax consequences unless the decedent's gross estate
totals at least $60,000, the basic exemption granted by § 2052. This exemption, combined
with the marital deduction of § 2056, permits most decedents to leave property valued at
$120,000 free of the estate tax.
21. A limited number of plans will not fall within either section. See notes 127-28
infra and accompanying text.
22. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039. The relevant portions of this provision state:
"(a) The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or other payment receiv-
able by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any form of con-
tract or agreement . . . (other than as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent), if, under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was
payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity
or payment, either alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in
fact end before his death.
(b) Subsection (a) shall apply to only such part of the value of the annuity or other
payment receivable under such contract or agreement as is proportionate to that part
of the purchase price therefor contributed by the decedent. For purposes of this
section, any contribution by the decedent's employer . . . to the purchase price of
such contract or agreement.., shall be considered to be contributed by the decedent
if made by reason of his employment."
Before the 1954 Code, no estate tax provision dealt directly with survivorship annuities
and similar benefits. Some courts analogized the survivorship annuity to a transfer with
a retained life estate, see, e.g., Commissioner v. -Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1942), while others considered the survivorship rights a transfer
intended to take effect at the decedent annuitant's death, see; e.g., Commissioner v. Wild-
er's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.)-, cert., denfed; 314 U.S. 634 (1941). Taxation of em-
ployee death benefits in this form was hampered due to technical considerations incident
to these constructions. LowNDEs & REAMEk, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT TAXES 50-52,
152-59 (1956) (hereinafter cited as LowNDEg & K ZAi.R)'; Bittker, Estate and Gift Tax-
ation Under the 1954 Code: The Principal Changes, 29 TUL. L. REv. 453, 468-70 (1955).
See also notes 60-69 infra and accompanying text. Section 2039 attempts to eliminate
technical requirements which previously thwarted estate taxation of survivorship annuities.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
90-91, A314 (1954). The single definition 'of taxable 'annuities set forth is intended to be
exhaustive. But the statutory language may not successfully implement this intent. See
text at notes 25-28 infra.
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all benefits in the proportion which the decedent's own contributions bear to
the total cost of the plan. For purposes of employee death benefits, contribu-
tions to the purchase price by an employer for any reason connected with the
employment are regarded as if made by the decedent employee himself. When
employer and employee together bear the entire cost of an annuity, the full
value of all proceeds is thus included in the latter's gross estate.23 And the
liability of section 2039 is imposed whether or not the employee had power
during life to control disposition of the proceeds at death.24
Despite the apparent breadth of section 2039, the statutory language is am-
biguous and may fall short of its objectives. For example, this provision speaks
of a decedent's "right to receive payment" and of benefits "payable" during
life.2 1; If strictly construed, this language may exclude benefits which prior to
a decedent's death were forfeitable, terminable or otherwise defeasible. 26 Such
benefits may not be "payable" within the meaning of section 2039, and the
decedent's interest may be an "expectancy" rather than a "right to receive pay-
ment. '27 Similarly, when an employer does not purchase a plan from an insur-
23. See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(c) (example 2), 21 FED. REG. 7876
(1956).
24. Compare the estate tax treatment of insurance under § 2042, in which control and
not contributions to cost is the touchstone. See text at notes 33-39 infra.
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039.
26. The employee's interest in retirement-death benefit plans is generally forfeitable
or otherwise terminable. The more common contingencies include: 1) continuity of ser-
vices until payment or retirement date whichever is earlier; 2) continuity of services after
retirement in consultative or advisory capacity; 3) non-competition with employer. Lefevre,
supra note 3, at 1086-87. See, generally, Allison, supra note 3, at 119-21. These contin-
gencies are thought sufficient to enable the employee to postpone recognizing employer
contributions as income until actual receipt of benefits. See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-i
(a) (1) (1957); Bock, Tax-saving Opportunities in Deferred Compensation under the
New Revenue Code, 99 J. AccOuNTANcy 39, 41 (March 1955) ; Diamond, szpra note 3,
at 618; Lefevre, supra note 3, at 1088; Rice, supra note 3, at 226-29. Forfeiture clauses
also encourage valued employees to continue their employment. Lefevre, supra note 3,
at 1088. Such conditions, however, may cause the employer to lose his deductions for con-
tributions to non-qualified plans. William M. Bailey Co., 15 T.C. 468 (1950), aff'd per
curiam, 192 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1951); Times Publishing Co., 13 T.C. 329 (1949); U.S.
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1957) ; Nelson, supra note 2, at 637; Rice, supra note 3, at
226; Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 490, 508-09 (1957). Nevertheless, as a statistical fact, the
majority of death benefits are forfeitable at the time when the employer contributes his
funds. COUPER & VAUGHAN, PENSION PLANNING EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS 121. (1954)
(hereinafter cited as COUPER & VAUGHAN).
27. Death benefits are not subject to § 2039 unless an annuity or other payment was
"payable to the decedent" or the "decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or
payment" during his lifetime; in addition the benefits must have been "receivable" by the
decedent's beneficiary. This language lends itself to technical distinctions derived from
pre-1954 case law. Prior to the 1954 Code, if the employee's rights to death benefits were
contingent or forfeitable, he was regularly held to possess merely an "expectancy" and
not "property." See, e.g., Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657, 664 (1950) ; note 64
infra (collecting cases) and accompanying text. At that time, estate taxation of employee
death benefits depended exclusively upon provisions taxing the decedent's "property." See
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ance company and instead pays death benefits directly, he may not have made
the "contributions" necessary under section 2039.28 Many courts were receptive
to analogous arguments under provisions governing before the 1954 Code.2 9
But the current regulations emphatically reject such semantic technicalities,3"
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 811(a), (c), (d), (f), as amended, 67 STAT. 623 (1953)( now
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-38, 2041) ; notes 60-69 infra and accompanying text. Loop-
holes created under the "expectancy" approach led to § 2039, which was intended to avoid
property law distinctions. See note 22 supra; see also Murphy, The Survivorship Annuity:
Estate Tax Kaleidoscope, 1 HOWAD L.J. 1, 3-29 (1955). But § 2039 may fail to solve
problems created by the pre-1954 cases. For example, if during life, the decedent received
no actual payments and his interest in death benefits was forfeitable, it may be argued that
the decedent lacked the requisite "right to receive" payment, or that benefits were not
"receivable" by his beneficiary within the meaning of § 2039. If pre-1954 case law is con-
trolling, he may possess merely an expectancy and no "right" at all. Similarly, even if the
decedent was receiving actual payments, the benefits are conceivably not "payable to the
decedent" within § 2039 if he possessed merely an "expectancy." See, generally, LoWnnDES
& KRAr 157, 158; WARREN & SuRREY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 284-85
(1956) (hereinafter cited as WARREN & SuRREY). For the current applicability of the pre-
1954 case law to non § 2039 benefits, see text at notes 57-71 infra; Garner, Income and
Estate Taxation of Annities, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 265, 284-90 (1955);
Murphy, supra at 29-39.
28. Section 2039(b) includes in the decedent's gross estate amounts attributable to his
contributions to the plan. And "any contribution by the decedent's employer . . . to the
purchase price" is treated as a contribution of the decedent in determining his gross estate.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (a). Thus if the employer pays the total employee benefits
directly without utilizing contracts purchased from a standard insurance company, it may
be argued that a contribution attributable to the decedent does not exist. Bittker, Estate
and Gift Taxation Under the 1954 Code: The Principal Changes, 29 TUL. L. REv. 453,
471 & n.62 (1955). Support for this argument derives by negative inference from the in-
come tax. Conpare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 105(a)'s specific taxation of direct em-
ployer payments to employees under accident and health plans with § 2039's omission to
include direct employer payment of death benefits. The argument has been rejected, how-
ever, by some commentators, see, e.g., Garner, supra note 27, at 286-87, and, apparently,
by the regulations, see note 30 infra.
29. See notes 27 supra, 64 infra.
30. The regulations consider employer contributions to a self-administered plan at-
tributable to the decedent for purposes of § 2039(b). Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1
(b) (examples 2-6), (c) (example 2), 21 FED. REG. 7876-77 (1956). The Treasury does
not specifically comment, however, on cases involving plans that are non-funded and pay-
ments from general funds, though in principle they seem the same as the examples. See
Garner, supra note 27, at 286-88.
The treatment of other semantic arguments is equally vigorous. For example, the regu-
lations interpret § 2039 as follows :
"An annuity or other payment 'was payable' to the decedent if, at the time of his
death, the decedent was in fact receiving an annuity or other payment, whether or not
he had an enforceable right to have payments continued. The decedent 'possessed the
right to receive' an annuity or other payment if, immediately before his death, the
decedent had an enforceable right to receive payments at some time in the future,
whether or not, at the time of his death, he had a present right to receive payments."
Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (2), 21 FED. REG. 7877 (1956). This regu-
lation clearly forecloses an argument of "unenforceability" where the decedent was in fact
receiving payment before death, and demonstrates that once a right to future payment be-
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and section 2039 itself was intended to close loopholes suggested by earlier
cases. 31 The courts should therefore liberally interpret this provision, and as a
general rule, amounts attributable to contributibns by employers and employees
to death benefit plans characterized as "annuities" should be subject to estate
taxation under section 2039.32
On the other hand, death benefits regarded as "insurance" incur the less
rigorous treatment of section 2042.3 3 The touchstone for estate taxation then
becomes the decedent's control over the policy at death and not contributions
to cost as in section 2039.34 While the proceeds of insurance receivable by the
comes enforceable, conditions deferring the time of payment will not avoid § 2039. While
in spirit cutting across semantic obstacles to taxation, it leaves unanswered the question of
what constitutes an "enforceable right." The illustrations suggest that "forfeitability" of
benefits does not render § 2039 inapplicable. Id. examples 2, 3. But the regulation expressly
meets the "expectancy" argument on forfeitable rights only where the decedent was actu-
ally receiving payment during life. Id. § 20.2039-1(b) (2). Whether or not the pre-1954
"expectancy theory" carries over to § 2039 is currently disputed by the authorities. Com-
pare Garner, supra note 27, at 285; Pyle, Itcome, Estate and Gift Taxation of Life, Acci-
dent and Sickness Insurance and Annuities under the 1954 Code, 1956 TULANE TAX INsT.
467, 658-59, with Murphy, supra note 27, at 36; Note, 6 STAN. L. REv. 473, 489 (1954). Cf.
G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 160. If it does, this section will be severely weakened,
since the majority of death benefit plans are forfeitable. See note 26 supra. But see notes
31, 32 infra and accompanying text.
31. See note 27 supra. The congressional reports tend to support the view that § 2039
was meant to provide a uniform scheme of taxation for all survivorship annuities irre-
spective of source or method of payment. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 123
(1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91, A315 (1954). Arguments from
the wording of § 2039 or from property law technicalities would seem inconsistent with
this purpose and should be rejected. And apart from § 2039, the distinctions were never
realistic. See notes 128-35 infra and accompanying text.
32. If technical arguments from the "expectancy" theory successfully avoid § 2039,
taxation of the benefits depends on other provisions of the Code. See text at notes 59-69
infra. Since these provisions tax only "property," avoidance of § 2039 may be equivalent
to avoidance of all estate taxation. Ibid.
33. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. This provision is "less vigorous" because it is
avoidable. See text at notes 38-40 infra. Section 2039(a) specifically excludes insurance
proceeds from its operation. For discussion of the meaning of "insurance," see text at
notes 73-82 infra.
34. The relevant portions of I T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 provide:
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
(1) Receivable by the executor ...
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.
To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under
policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at
his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunc-
tion with any other person...."
Prior to 1954, insurance proceeds were included in the gross estate if the decedent re-
tained control over the policy or if he paid the premiums, directly or indirectly. Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 811(g), as amended, 56 STAT. 944 (1942). Section 2042 dropped the pre-
mium payment test. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91, A316-17 (1954), S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954). The proper test for taxation of insurance
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decedent's executor or estate are included in the gross estate, those receivable
by all other beneficiaries are taxable only if the decedent possessed at death
"incidents of ownership" in the policy.35 This term refers to the insured's
rights to the economic benefits of the policy, and encompasses powers to cancel,
surrender or assign the policy, and to designate beneficiaries, as well as certain
reversionary interests.3 6 Retention of any incident of ownership at death will
bring into the decedent's gross estate the face amounts payable under the
policies.37 But the tax liability of section 2042 is easily avoided. For the pro-
ceeds of life insurance pass tax free to beneficaries if the insured divests him-
self of control more than three years before death.38 And this result follows
whether or not the decedent contributed to the cost of the insurance.3 9
An employee's beneficiaries may thus receive the proceeds from insurance
coverage purchased by the employer free of estate tax consequences if the em-
ployee's control over the proceeds is eliminated. An arrangement whereby the
ordinary incidents of ownership are divested is readily provided.40 Sometimes,
however, an employee may be unable to divest all control. For example, upon
severance from employment, legislation in some states requires an insurance
company providing group coverage to convert the employee's policy into an
individual contract without loss of accrued benefits. 41 When a new policy is
proceeds has been the subject of much debate. See text at note 136 infra. H.R. 8381, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) would reintroduce the premium payment test if the policy was pur-
chased or transferred within five years of the decedent's death but only to the extent that thu
proceeds are attributable to premiums paid within that period. See H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th
Cong., 1stSess. 37-38 (1957).
35. IrT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2042(1)-(2).
36. See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2)-(5), 21 FED. REG. 7885-86
(1956).
37. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2). See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1
(a) (3), 21 FED. REG. 7885 (1956).
38. If the insured does not possess the requisite incidents of ownership himself or in
conjunction with another, § 2042 does not apply. 2 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION
§ 1.1.06 (1956) (hereinafter cited as BEVERIDGE) ; LowNDES & KRAMER, 279; 3 RAKIN
& JOHNSON § 61.05. Insurance is no longer taxable merely because the decedent paid the
premiums. Ibid. See note 34 supra. For discussion of the ease with which a tax is avoided
under § 2042, in contrast with the former premium payment test, see BITTKER, FEDERAL
INCOME, ESTATE AND Girt TAXATION 1166-71 (1955); LOwNDES & KRAMER 273-79; Bitt-
ker, Estate and Gift Taxation under the 1954 Code: The Principal Changes, 29 TuL. L.
REV. 453, 464-67 (1955).
Divestment of control within three years of death may be a gift in contemplation of
death under § 2035. Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950) ; BiTT-
KER, FEDERAl. INcOME, ESTATE AND Girt TAXATION 1168-70 (1955) ; LOwNDES & KRAMER
288-89; WAREN & SuRREY 530-31. But cf. Note, 66 YALE L.J. 142, 150 nA7 (1956). Con-
sequently if the insured divests himself of all control over the policy more than three years
prior to death, the proceeds are almost certain to be free from estate tax liability. LOWNDES
& KRAMER 298.
39. See note 34 supra.
40. See note 38 supra. If the insurance benefits are payable under a qualified plan,
extra precaution must be taken in divesting control. See note 17 supra.
41. 3 RIA, FED. TAX COORDINATOR R-4014. An illustrative statute is N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 161 (e). The MODEL GRouP LIFE INsURANcE LAW, -proposed by the National Association
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issued in this fashion, control formerly divested may, at least temporarily, re-
turn to the insured. Conversely, when not restrained by state law, employers
may provide that all coverage terminates upon severance of the employment.
42
In effect, the employee then has a power of revocation which he can exercise
by leaving his job. 43 Nevertheless, such controls need not be "incidents of
ownership" under section 2042. 4 4 Severance under a forfeitable plan may en-
tail the employee's loss of all economic benefits of the insurance and therefore
preclude his power of revocation from constituting an incident of ownership as
defined by the regulations. 45 Even where state law assures the employee of
accrued benefits after severance, advance planning may prevent the return of
substantial control to the insured when and if a new policy is issued in the
future. 46 1oreover, the necessity of leaving employment to exercise the "power"
of Insurance Commissioners and adopted in many states, makes mandatory a provision
that, upon severance from employment, the insured may elect to take an individual policy
on any plan but group term insurance. MEHR & OsLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 262-63
(revised ed. 1956) (hereinafter cited as MEHR & OSLER).
42. Cf. 'unch, Estate Tax Problems in Transfers of Life Insurance, N.Y.U. 15TH
INST. ON FED. TAx. 219, 223 (1957). However, most group insurance policies contain the
privilege of conversion to permanent individual insurance upon termination of employment.
O'NEILL 224, 230; 3 RABKIN & JOHNSON § 62.04(3). See also WxArr 76-77.
43. The regulations include the power to "cancel the policy" among the incidents of
ownership under § 2042. Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2), 21 FED. REG. 7885
(1956). It is arguable that the power to terminate insurance coverage by leaving employ-
ment is equivalent to the power to cancel and is therefore an incident of ownership. See
note 44 infra. But see note 45 infra.
44. Apparently there is no authority as to whether the power to terminate group in-
surance coverage by leaving employment, or the power to convert group coverage into an
individual policy by terminating employment, constitute "incidents of ownership." Thus,
the commentators state that either of these powers "might" be an incident of ownership
and acknowledge that the question remains open. 3 RABKIN & JOHNSON § 62.04(3) ; 3
RIA, FED. TAX COORiNATOR R-4014; Munch, supra note 42, at 223. The Commissioner
would probably have a stronger case for an incident of ownership construction if the em-
ployee can terminate coverage merely by discontinuing his contributions.
45. An incident of ownership is defined as the right "to the economic benefits of the
policy." Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2), 21 FED. RE. 7885 (1956). When
the employee quits, he may forfeit all accrued benefits. See note 42 supra. In that event,
he would receive no beneficial interest, and his power before severance would clearly not
be an incident of ownership. Most often, however, the employee will have the option to
receive accrued contributions upon severance. Ibid. This option is somewhat analogous
to the power of obtaining the cash surrender value of an insurance policy, which is an in-
cident of ownership. But this power merely returns deferred compensation to the em-
ployee, and does not give him rights directly in the benefits of the insurance policy.
46. The original plan estblishing insurance coverage could include provisions designed
to prevent the return of any incidents of ownership to the insured when and if he converts
to an individual policy upon terminating employment. For example, the plan could provide
that the group policy beneficiary automatically be made the beneficiary of the individual
policy. Provisions could also be made to have other incidents of ownership vest in accord-
ance with the group plan. However, if state law requires that the insured be given the
power to designate the beneficiaries upon conversion, such an arrangement may not be
possible. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 161(1) (d).
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neutralizes control and militates against an "incident of ownership" construc-
tion. Accordingly, the employer would appear generally able to create a plan
giving life insurance coverage to his employees free of estate tax liability.
However, employers may not be able to arrange tax free treatment when in-
surance proceeds are provided directly from their own funds and not through
a standard insurance company. 47 The pre-1954 case law suggests that death
benefits paid by the employer may not be characterized as "insurance" within
section 2042.48 And both Congress and the Commissioner leave the issue
47. Employee death benefit-retirement plans are generally financed in one of three
ways: through a commercial insurance company or directly by the employer on a funded
or non-funded basis. The employer "funds" a plan by establishing a trust or reserve to
which he systematically contributes. Alternatively, the employer's arrangement may be
quite informal or "non-funded" as when he obligates himself to pay death benefits some-
time in the future without any present earmarking of funds for this purpose. See, general-
ly, CoUPE, & VAUGHAN 27-34; O'NEILL 31-42; SIBSON, A SURVEY OF PENSION PLANNING
15-23 (1953) (hereinafter cited as SIBsoN) ; St. John, Financing a Pension Plan, in HAND-
BOOK FOR PmSION PLANNING 83 (1.949) ; Gordon, supra note 16, at 240.
Whether or not a death benefit is "insurance" depends in the first instance upon the
function of the plan during the decedent's lifetime and its particular status at death; for
analysis of the nature of insurance, see notes 73-82 infra and accompanying text. The dis-
cussion following in text assumes that the benefits conferred are functionally "insurance";
the problem is then whether such plans will be considered insurance for tax purposes.
48. See Estate of John C. Morrow, 19 T.C. 1068 (1953). Few cases squarely meet
the issue; but the absence of a professional insurance company has consistently caused
courts difficulty in classifying death benefits as "insurance." The size of the plan, its per-
manency and the extent to which the employer's performance resembles the operations of
an insurance company are significant criteria. See Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,
40 B.T.A. 268 (1939) (dictum); Estate of Max Strauss, 13 T.C. 159, 166 (1949)
(majority and dissenting opinions), rez'd sub nomn. Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183
F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950). For example, considerations thought
relevant have been whether a physical examination was required, see Helvering v. Le
Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 537 (1941); Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., supra at 271
(dictum) ; Estate of Max Strauss, supra at 165; and whether the plan is subject to state
insurance regulation, Kernochan v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 507, 29 F. Supp. 860 (1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 675 (1940). And the Treasury regulations suggest that an employer's
failure to maintain technical computations normally associated with professional insurers
may be crucial. See discussion of "terminal reserve" and its implications at notes 78-82
infra. Furthermore, the extent to which the employer formalizes his obligations in a con-
tract, and the certainty of payment from the employee's perspective, are important factors.
See Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938),
aff'd, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Illinois Merchants Trust, 12 B.T.A. 818, 820 (1928); see
also Note, 48 COLUm. L. Rv. 393, 400-01 (1948); 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFrT
TAXATION § 10.10 (1942). Often, the promise of an employer is considerably less binding
or enforceable than that of an insurance company, which supplies a formidable ground for
distinction. Analogous distinctions exist for income tax purposes. Compare Guaranty
-Trust Co., 15 B.T.A. 20 (1929), with J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936). Compare
also United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950), with J. D. Amend, 13 T.C.
178 (1949).
According to at least one author, the cases make it "doubtful that a death benefit paid
by an employer could be subject to tax as insurance." Nelson, supra note 2, at 634. But
the above cases were decided prior to 1954 on specific issues generally not pertinent under
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clouded under the Code. 49 This possibility can adversely affect plans in which
retirement income or other lifetime payment is a feature. Death benefits under
such plans may be taxed as the survivorship portion of an annuity if they are
not considered insurance.50 The basis of liability would then become contri-
butions to cost under section 2039 rather than control, and the ability to effect
divestment would be inconsequential. 51 In contrast, employees receiving iden-
tical coverage under formal policies issued by an insurance company would
face only the avoidable tax burden of section 2042.52 Moreover, if no lifetime
feature is involved, employer payments may comprise a third category reached
neither by sections 2039 nor 2042.53 Estate taxation of the proceeds would
then be determined by still different principles.
the present Code. Furthermore, several cses declare that the mere absence of a standard
contract from an insurance company should make no difference. See Commissioner v. Tre-
ganowan, supra; Kernochan v. United States, supra; Estate of William J. O'Shea, 47
B.T.A. 646 (1942) ; see also Note, 59 YALE L.J. 780 (1950). However, the actual hold-
ings of these cases leave the matter unresolved.
49. The distinction between insurance benefits received from an insurance company
and those paid directly by the employer may be perpetuated by H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A315 (1954) and S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954) which
in example 4 consider an "annuity" paid directly by an employer without the aid of an
insurance company subject to § 2039, although in fact it may functionally be insurance.
See note 114 infra (detailed evaluation of example 4) ; see also text at notes 102-14 infra.
Furthermore, Congress has distinguished employer from standard insurance benefits for
purposes of the income tax. Section 22(b) of the 1939 Code was amended to exempt em-
ployer insurance payments sometime after "insurance" was already exempt. See Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 22(b) (1) (B), added by 65 STAT. 483 (1951). The same language was
carried over into § 101. Compare INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 101(a) (1.) with § 101(b) (1).
This distinction for income taxation, and the lack of similar treatment in the estate tax,
indicates that Congress intended employer paid benefits not to be "insurance." See Nelson,
supra note 2, at 634. But see text at notes 102-14 infra.
The regulations studiously avoid the issue, but their examples lend fuel to the fire. An
example is given of a contract purchased from a standard insurer for purposes of distin-
guishing between an "annuity" and "insurance.' This example emphasizes the importance
of the policy's "terminal reserve" in determining whether the proceeds are "annuity" or
"insurance." Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d), (example), 21 FED. REG.
7877-78 (1956). For the meaning and implications of "terminal reserve," see notes 78-81
infra. Since employers paying death benefits may not ordinarily be expected to use "termi-
nal" reserve computations, the regulations may not consider such benefits "insurance" by
negative inference. This inference is strengthened by reference to examples elsewhere in
the regulations which demonstrate the applicability of § 2039 to employee death benefit
retirement plans: the plans in these examples are all employer-funded. Proposed U.S.
-Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (2) (examples 2-6), (c) (example 2), 21 FED. REG. 7876-77
(1956).
50. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2039.
51. See note 22 supra.
52. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
53. Section 2039 applies only if the decedent was paid or had rights to be paid during
his lifetime. Section 2042 is inapplicable by hypothesis. Therefore, the proceeds are tax-
able, if at all, as "property" under more general provisions of the estate tax. For tax
treatment in this situation, see notes 60-69 infra and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, this distinction between commercial and employer-paid
insurance benefits may confer tax advantages upon employees who participate
in qualified plans. Ordinarily, despite a qualified status, the proceeds of life
insurance remain taxable under section 2042 and are not exempted by section
2039(c) . 4 But if the qualified benefits are paid directly by the employer, and
the proceeds are consequently not classified as insurance, the employee may be
able to retain the exemption under section 2039(c). 5 The preferential treat-
ment thus accorded some self-administered plans will affect firms differently
depending upon their size. Smaller firms with limited financial resources must
generally operate through an insurance company.56 Their employees may thus
lose estate tax exemptions in situations where those of larger, self-insuring
firms would not.
Beyond Sections 2039 and 2042: An Anomalous Category
Estate taxation of employee death benefits is further complicated by some
plans which fall within neither sections 2039 nor 2042. Death benefits lacking
any inter vivos feature are clearly not subject to section 2039.7 If in addition
the arrangement contains no element of insurance, section 2042 is equally in-
applicable. Some deferred compensation plans fit this description, since the
employer may act merely as a repository for deferred employee earnings-like
a savings bank-while conferring no risk shifting advantages. s Although other
sections of the Code may be available to tax such death benefits, these pro-
visions turn upon technical property law doctrines which greatly impede their
effectiveness.59
54. See text at notes 14-15 supra.
55. The employee will also be able to retain controls over the proceeds without incur-
ring estate tax liability. See text at note 24 supra. But if the plan involves no lifetime
feature, entirely different provisions govern. See notes 60-69 infra and accompanying text.
56. Insurance is based upon actuarial principles, which in turn depend upon data
derived from large numbers of people for successful application. See notes 74-78, 112 infra.
When small numbers are involved, actuarial predictions may not be realized, and the
enterprise must bear the resulting loss. For this reason small companies generally adopt
an "insured" plan. Gordon, supra note 16, at 241 & n.24; SIasox 18.
57. See note 22 supra. Because of its ambiguous language, some plans with a lifetime
feature may also escape § 2039. See text at notes 26-28 supra. See also Garner, supra note
27, at 283-90; Murphy, supra note 27, at 29-39.
58. See Note, 48 CoLuiM. L. REv. 393, 394-95 (1948) ; Diamond, supra note 3, at 617-
18; Lefevre, supra note 3, at 1081-83; Rice, supra note 3, at 225-26. For an example of a
deferred compensation plan held to involve no element of risk shifting, see Knight v. Fin-
negan, 74 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Mo. 1947). See also Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531
(1941). These plans would currently be subject to § 2039 only where a lifetime feature is
involved. Otherwise they are subject to still other estate tax provisions. See text at notes
60-69 infra.
59. The congressional reports specifically state that § 2039 is not exclusive and that
the provisions of § 2039 shall not prevent the application of other sections of the estate tax.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
A316 (1954). See also Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d), 21 FED. REG. 7877-78
(1956). Annuity proceeds or other payments may be taxable under § 2033 as property in
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For example, sections 2033 and 2041 respectively reach death benefits
in which the decedent possessed a property interest at death or over which
he retained a general power of appointment during life.60 They are in-
operative, however, unless the interest which the employee possessed in the
benefits amounted to a "property right" at death. 61 And property in this con-
nection is usually defined as a legally enforceable right to payment at, or prior
to, death .1 2 For this reason, death benefits which prior to the employee's death
were forfeitable, terminable or subject to the employer's discretion may escape
taxation under sections 2033 and 2041.63 On the accepted view, such benefits
are considered mere "expectancies" and not payable under vested, enforceable
property rights.0 4 Even when the employee's expectation is based upon past
which the decedent had an interest at death; under § 2035 if decedent transferred the con-
tract in contemplation of death; under § 2037 if decedent transferred the contract subject
to a retained reversionary interest; as a revocable transfer under § 2038 if decedent re-
tained the power to designate beneficiaries; or under § 2041 if he possessed at death a
general power of appointment with respect to the annuity rights. See Murphy, supra note
27, at 3-25; Waldo, Life Insurance and Annuities under the 1954 Revenue Code, 1955 U.
ILL. L. FoRuM 380, 395-96. Similarly life insurance proceeds which are not includible in
the gross estate under § 2042 may be includible under some other estate tax provision.
Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (2), 21 FED. REG. 7885 (1.956) ; see INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, 3§ 2035-38, 2041; 2 BEVERIDGE § 11.01; LowNDEs & KRAMER 288-89. How-
ever, § 2033 is not applicable to such proceeds. See Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1952) ; Proutt's Estate v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1942). Contra,
LowNDES & KRAMER 46-47.
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033. See Estate of Arthur W. Davis, 11 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 814 (1952); Estate of Leonard B. McKitterick, 42 B.T.A. 130 (1940); LowNDEs
& IWMER 50 (collecting cases).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041. See LOWNDES & KRAmER 269-70; Bilder, Death Bene-
fits Paid Under an Express Contract, 34 TAXES 529, 531 (1956) ; Murphy, mpra note 27,
at 24. For examples of death benefits falling within § 2041, see Estate of Eugene F. Sax-
ton, 12 T.C. 569, 574 (1949) (dictum); G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 160.
61. Section 2033 provides that "the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty. . . ." Section 2041 states "to the extent of any property. . . ." In interpreting the
word "property" in these and other estate tax provisions, the courts have resorted to dis-
tinctions between "property" and "mere expectancies." See cases cited note 64 infra.
62. See Molter v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Dimock v.
Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd on other grounds, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir.
1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 363 (1939) ; Estate of Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951) ; Estate of
Emil A. Stake, 1.1 T.C. 817 (1948).
63. Use of these conditions is discussed at note 26 supra.
64. The principal case is Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd
on other grounds, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 363 (1939). The contract
there involved provided that the benefits granted under the plan were voluntary and speci-
fically reserved to the employer the right to withdraw or modify them at any time. The
court held that decedent during life had only the means to enable his beneficiary to receive
a grant from the employer; decedent himself possessed a mere expectancy and not a
property right. Id. at 58, 59. See also Molter v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y.
1956) (terminable right an expectancy, not property); Estate of William S. Miller,
14 T.C. 657 (1950) (same); G.C.M. 17817, 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 281. Contra, G.C.M.
27242, 1952-1 Cuai. BULL. 160.
The "expectancy theory" has been expanded to cover a variety of contingencies. The
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practices and therefore amounts to a virtual certainty, this argument has pre-
vailed.65
Death benefits are taxable under still other provisions which impose liability
upon certain inter vivos property transfers: sections 2035, 2036, 2037 and
2038.66 However, for these sections to operate, not only must there be property
which can be transferred, and an actual transfer, but the decedent must have
been the transferor as well.T Obviously, opportunities for manipulation are
plentiful. For example, under existing law, identification of the transferor turns
upon the origin of the plan. If in salary negotiations the employee bargains for
death benefits, courts correctly consider him the transferor, reasoning that his
performance of services actually effects the transfer of property from employer
to beneficiaries.68 But when the employer unilaterally establishes death benefits
reAsoning in each case is essentially that the employee's right to benefits is subject to a
condition and does not vest until fulfillment of the condition or death. The following are
illustrative contingencies held to make the right to death benefits an expectancy: (1) the
exnployee must reach a certain age or continue in employment for a specified number of
years, Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Estate of William S. Miller,
supra; Estate of M. Hadden Howell, 15 T.C. 224 (1950) ; Estate of Emil A. Stake, 11
T.C. 817 (1948) ; (2) the employee must not be employed by a competitor, convicted of
a felony, adjudged bankrupt or have a judgment for payment of money against him, Estate
of William S. Miller, supra; (3) the beneficiary must survive the decedent in order to be
entitled to payment, Dimock v. Corwin, supra; see Estate of Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92
(1951).
65. See Estate of Albert L. Salt, supra note 64. Regular death benefits had been paid,
as authorized by the plan, to every eligible beneficiary during its entire fifteen year exist-
ence. Since payments were "discretionary," however, the court held decedent's interest a
"mere expectancy." Id. at 97, 100.
66. INT. Rxv. 'CoDE OF 1954, §§ 2035-38 (respectively, transfers in contemplation of
death, transfers with a retained life estate, transfers by decedent taking effect at death and
revocable transfers).
Designation of a beneficiary is a "transfer" within these sections. See, e.g., Adeline S.
Davis, 27 T.C. 378 (1956); Estate of William J. O'Shea, 47 B.T.A. 646 (1942);
Estate of Stuart Wilson, 42 B.T.-A. 1196 (1940) ; Kernochan v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl.
507, 29 F. Supp. 860 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 675 (1940). Reserved powers to amend
or revoke the designation once made are illustrative controls likely to incur taxation of the
entire proceeds. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038; see also Adeline S. Davis,
supra; Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-4(c) (4), 21 FED. REG. 7885-86 (1956); 2
BEVERiDGE § 11.10; LowND S & KRAm 48, 288.
67. The cases under these sections also encounter the "property-expectancy" problem.
See Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Estate of M. Hadden Howell,
15 T.C. 224 (1950) ; Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950) ; see also note 64
supra. Under the 1939 Code, the forerunners of §§ 2035-38 applied to "property transfers."
See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c), (d), as amended, 67 STAT. 623 (1953). The 1954
provisions are substantially identical. Consequently earlier decisions failing to find a tax-
able transfer by the decedent may be currently applicable. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Two-
good's Estate, 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Estate of William S. Miller, supra. See, gen-
erally, 2 BEVERIDGE §§ 12.07-.08; LOWNDES & KRAMER 154-59; Murphy, supra note 27, at
25-28.
68. See Estate of Paul G. Leoni, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 759 (1948) ; see also Estate
of William L. Nevin, 11 T.C. 59 (1948).
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and initially, though tentatively, designates beneficiaries for his employees, the
designation is not regarded as a transfer by the employee, despite the tenuous-
ness of the distinction. 69 Because of such formalistic distinctions, employees
who receive death benefits subject to neither sections 2039 nor 2042 may avoid
estate taxation altogether,70 even when they remained factually in control over
the proceeds at death.71
EVALUATION OF THE LABELS
Estate taxation of most employee death benefits under the 1954 Code is only
as workable as the line between sections 2039 and 2042 is clear. Section 2039
expressly contains an outer boundary; it does not apply unless a decedent em-
ployee was entitled to receive some form of inter vivos payment in addition to
death benefits. Given this lifetime feature, however, the two sections overlap.
For the same plan may confer both "insurance" and "annuity" benefits at dif-
ferent times within a single employee's life span.7 2 Accordingly, a precise dis-
tinction between these concepts is essential.
Insurance vs. Annuities-A Functional Approach
In the leading case of Helvering v. Le Gierse, the Supreme Court recognized
the earmarks of life insurance as "risk-shifting and risk-distributing."73 The
insured shifts the risk of financial loss from premature death to the insurer
who spreads the loss among all policy holders.7 4 The cost of standard life in-
69. Eugene F. Saxton, 12 T.C. 569, 572, 575 (1949). But see LOWNDES & KRAMER 1S6.
70. Although these distinctions were made prior to the 1954 Code and therefore need
not be currently applicable, many commentators believe they will be carried over. See, e.g.,
Garner, Income and Estate Taxation of Annuities, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 265,
285-88 (1955) ; Pyle, Income, Estate and Gift Taxation of Life, Accident and Sickness
Insurance and Annuities Under the 1954 Code, 1956 TuL. TAX INsT. 467, 658-59. But see
note 128 infra.
71. Since the employer is compensating his employee by means of death benefits, a
community of interest for purposes of naming beneficiaries may be inferred.
72. A plan combining insurance protection with annuity features will be taxed as
either an annuity or insurance according to the nature of the benefit at death. See note 101
infra. But classification as "insurance" has been inconsistent, depending on the nature of
the obligation and obligor. See notes 48-49 supra. The inconsistency has resulted in con-
fused and divergent estate tax consequences due to the interplay of the following factors:
(1) the exclusion of "insurance" from the operation of § 2039, see notes 14, 22 supra; (2)
§ 2039(c)'s exclusion of payments under qualified plans from imposition of the estate tax,
see note 11 supra; (3) the apparent limitation of § 2039(c) to non-insurance benefits, see
note 14 supra; (4) the different tests for taxation provided in § 2039 and § 2042. Conse-
quently consistent administration of the tax structure depends on a clear and predictable
distinction.
73. 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
74. See 312 U.S. at 531.
The text discussion of insurance principles is simplified for exposition and confined to
those aspects especially relevant in estate taxation of employee death benefits. On shifting
risk to the insurer, see ACKERMAN, INSURANcE 3 (3d ed. 1948) (hereinafter cited as
ACxKcE AN) ; ALLEN, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 3-4 (1937) (hereinafter cited
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surance is geared to the insured's life expectancy. 75 Upon his death pre-
maturely, the face amount of the policy is paid to beneficiaries even though the
premiums received by the insurer fall short of the amount it calculated the in-
sured would pay had he lived to the anticipated date.7 This difference is loss
assumed by other policy holders. Conversely, the insured while alive must in-
cur some of the loss occasioned by the premature deaths of others; his contri-
butions include an amount designed by the insurer to defray mortality costs. 77
The remainder, less service charges, is "reserved" toward the face amount due
at maturity. 78 In rare instances, an insured who is particularly long lived will
contribute enough to meet both the face amount and requisite mortality costs. 70
At this point, the face amount and what is called "terminal reserve" are equal.
Terminal reserve is a mathematically computed variable which on the com-
as ALLEN); MEHR & OSLER 22-23; RIEGEL & LOMAN, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRAC-
TICES 27 (1929) (hereinafter cited as RIEGEL & LOMAN). For distribution of risk to other
policy holders, see ALLEN 5; MEHR & OSLER 25-30; RIEGEL & LOMAN 27. For discussions
of actuarial tables, nature of risks and computation of insurance premiums, see ALLEN 5,
12-13, 51-55, 107-11; LE VITA, AN ARITHMETIC OF LIFE INSURANCE 6-21, 94-102 (1936)
(hereinafter cited as LE VITA) ; MEHR & OSLER 24, 441-523; MENGE & GLOVER, AN I N-
TRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF LIFE INsURANcE 1-19, 48-71, 153-75 (1935) (here-
inafter cited as MENGE & GLovER) ; RIEGEL & LOMAN 30-32, 114-32.
75. Other important factors bearing on the premium amount are insurer expenses and
interest rates. The expected interest return reduces the cost to the insured. See ALLEN
54-55, 60-63; RIEGEL & LomAx 119-34.
76. Under an "ordinary" life policy-where the insured pays periodic level premiums-
the insurer loses premiums upon the insured's premature death because the latter is
obligated to pay throughout his life. See ACKERMAN 27-28; ALLEN 35; RIEGEL & LOMAN
95, 96 (graph), 97. Whether or not an insured would in fact continue to pay after reach-
ing his actuarially predicted life expectancy depends upon such factors as use of insurer
dividends to reduce premium payments or acceptance of "paid-up" value as insurance. See
ACKERMAN 33-38; MEHR & OsLER 55-56.
A somewhat different analysis is applicable when single premium or limited payment
life insurance plans are used instead of the level premium policy. Obviously, the insured's
obligation to pay premiums does not then extend throughout his life or even his life ex-
pectancy. See ACKERMAN 28; RIEGEL & LOMAN 97-98. Still, under a limited payment
life policy, if the insured dies prematurely and before all his premiums have been paid, the
insurer loses. And if death occurs after final payment, or after payment of a single lump-
sum premium but before the actuarially predicted date, the insurer loses the interest which
the payments would have earned. The expected interest return is taken into account in
computing the cost of the policy to the insured; cost is reduced by this expected revenue.
See ALLEN 54-58.
77. See, e.g., ACKERMAN 70; RIEGEL & LoMAN 138.
78. See ibid.; note 80 infra. A policy matures when "the face value is paid either by
reason of death or by reason of the survival of the insured to the end of a given period."
MEHR & OsLER 56. For discussion of "maturity" in connection with endowment contracts
see notes 86-88 infra.
79. At this point, the insured is actuarially dead. For discussion of contracts other
than "ordinary life," see note 76 supra.
An individual is considered "dead" at age ninety-six, since actuarial tables extend only
to age ninety-five. See ALLEN 52, 53; RIEGEL & LOMAN 139, 141. And the insurer should
then become liable for the face amount of the policy.
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pany's books reflects at any given moment the total amount of premiums re-
ceived plus interest accumulations at the assumed rate less the total cost of risk
distribution.8 0 The terminal reserve figure thus represents that portion of pre-
mium payments theoretically set aside which, with accrued interest, will be
applied to the insurer's obligation at maturity of the policy.8 ' This concept can
be crucial in estate taxation of death benefits. For when terminal reserve equals
face amount, no further element of risk shifting or distributing exists under the
policy. Thereafter, the proceeds are merely the return of savings and not in-
surance.
8 2
A survivorship annuity, on the other hand, is not insurance precisely because
80. Since insurers must be prepared to meet future demands, monetary "reserves" are
essential. Insurance laws generally require reserves to be accumulated on each policy at
the end of each year. See ALLEN 66; RIEGEL & LOaSAN 144-45. This "accumulation,"
derived from premium payments, is that part of premiums not used to defray mortality
costs and other expenses. See ACKERMAN 70. In reality, the total amount of premiums
plus compounded interest is calculated to satisfy all losses and expenses to be charged
against a policy. The net single premium plan clearly illustrates this principle and level
premiums are its mathematical equivalent. See ALLEN 58-60, 68, 69. Thus, the part of
premiums paid not necessary to satisfy death claims (mortality costs) will equal, with
accrued interest, the face amount of the policy at actuarial death. See note 79 supra; see
also ALLEN 69; RIEaEL & LOMAN 137-39, 140 (table). For clarification, it should be
recognized that terminal reserve less the charge for cashing in a policy equals cash sur-
render value. Id. at 137.
The amount of terminal reserve at any particular time necessarily varies with a number
of factors: (1) type of policy; (2) mode of premium payments; (3) age of the insured
when the policy is issued; (4) length of coverage; (5) mortality tabulations; (6) in-
terest rate utilized. ACKERMAN 71; ALLEN 66-67; RIEGEL & LOMAN 137-44. For example,
the reserve at the end of the first year will be greater on a single premium policy than on
the level premium variety, and its size increases proportionately with that of the assumed
rate of interest. Moreover, it is evident that reserves are impossible on certain types of
premiums such as natural -premiums, id. at 120-22, which are geared to yearly mortality
costs and are virtually exhausted at the conclusion of a particular year. See ALLEN 66-67;
RIEGEL & LOMAN 138.
81. Since terminal reserve can be calculated at any time, its most usual definition is in
terms of particular policy years. Thus, it has been defined as "that sum which with addi-
tions from all future premium receipts, plus interest payments, will pay all future maturi-
ties under the policy." CROBAUGH, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 1278 (1931). However,
characterization of terminal reserve as a "fund" on "each particular policy," while en-
dorsed by many authorities, has been criticized. Compare ACKERMAN 71, ALLEN 66 with
RIE EL & LOMAN 556. The latter authors prefer to regard it as a "liability," not a fund,
representing the "total amount" needed by the insurer to satisfy future claims without
reference to each particular policy. But the "fund-particular policy" view seems prefer-
able, since the various methods of computing terminal reserve in a given policy year are
directed towards ascertaining a fund existing on each policy. See ALLEN 67-70; LE VITA
34-60; MEER & OSLER 558-62; MENGE & GLOVER 72-140. And this view accords with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue's use of the term. See note 101 infra.
82. The regulations adopt this analysis for distinguishing between the "insurance" and
"annuity" portions of a retirement death benefit plan. Proposed US. Treas. Reg. § 20.20-
39-1(d), 21 FED. REG. 7877-78 (1956). See note 101 infra. But if the plan is not pur-
chased from an insurance company, this approach may not be followed. See note 114 infra.
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it does not shift the investor's risk of premature death to others.83 Rather, the
typical survivorship annuity is designed to return premiums paid plus interest
to the primary annuitant and his designated survivor over the duration of their
life expectancies.8 4 If both die prematurely, the amount received under this
contract, unlike life insurance, will necessarily be less than the amount con-
tributed. And the unreturned portion is retained by the insurance company for
allocation among other annuitants who outlive their life expectancies.8
For estate tax purposes, the distinction between insurance and annuity is
most crucial when a death benefit plan combines features of both. One such
plan is the life insurance endowment contract: it shifts from insurance to sav-
ings after the expiration of a stipulated period of time. If the insured dies
within this period, his beneficiaries receive the full proceeds of the policy. If
he survives, the face amount becomes payable to himself, either in a lump sum
or in installments for life with remainder to designated beneficiaries.8 0  The
endowment contract is priced so that by the end of the designated period, pre-
miums received will equal the face amount plus mortality costs occasioned by
the premature deaths of similar policy holders within the same period.8 7 More
83. Survivorship annuities may be regarded as one of several "investment" contracts
sold by insurance companies. Cf. ALLEN 47-48; MEHR & OsLEm 69, 78. The endowment
contract is another. ACKERMAN 21; CROBAUGH, HANDBOOK OF INsURANcE 478-80 (1931).
But labeling these contracts "investment" is misleading, since life insurance may also be
purchased for "investment" purposes. Furthermore, the terminal reserve value of a life
insurance contract has been called its "investment" portion. RIEGEL_ & LOM,1AN 94-100
(tables).
A more graphic distinction is in terms of the nature of the risk shifted, for both life
insurance and survivorship annuities will involve "risk shifting." The annuity, however,
rewards long lived beneficiaries, in contrast with life insurance which benefits only those
who die prematurely. See note 85 infra. For estate tavc purposes, a generic label
describing "non-insurance" benefits is less important than an ability to determine func-
tionally when they occur. Yet the difficulties of generically distinguishing "annuities" and
"insurance" casts fundamental doubt on the estate tax scheme which in §§ 2039 and 2042
imposes differing tax principles for each label. See notes 126, 136 infra and adcompanying
text.
84. See ACKERMAN 56; ALLEN 47; MEHR & OSLER 69-70, 78.
85. Thus, although life insurance and survivorship annuities both involve "risk shift-
ing," they are functionally exact opposites. When annuitants die prematurely, the other
policy holders are benefited for the cost to them is reduced. Short-lived individuals covered
by life insurance increase the costs to similar policy holders by their premature deaths.
'See ALLEN 41-47; MEHIR & OSLER 69-70; see also notes 74-78 suptra and accompanying
text.
86. Pure endowment contracts are payable only if the insured lives until the policy
matures. ALLEN 43. However, as commonly used, the term encompasses payments to a
designated beneficiary in the event of the insured's premature death as well as the obliga-
tion at maturity. A more accurate designation of the combined plan is "life insurance en-
dowment contract," since it combines elements of "pure endowment" and "term insurance."
"The Endowment policy might be said to be a savings fund protected by Term insur-
ance...." MEHR & OSLER 45. See AcKERMAN 28-29; ALLEN 43; RIEGEL & LOMAN 98-103.
87. Expiration of thecperiod marks the policy's maturity and is thus the event which
obligates the company to commence payment. The terminal reserve will therefore reach
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concisely, the policy's terminal reserve is designed to equal its face amount
upon expiration of the period. Accordingly, when the insured dies premature-
ly and the face amount is paid to beneficiaries, the company necessarily has re-
ceived less than the amount it calculated the insured would pay had he lived to
the end of the period.88 To this extent, the plan is insurance, since loss from
the insured's premature death is shifted to the insurer and thereby distrib-
uted.89 However, once the insured lives beyond the specified date when terminal
reserve equals face amount, the policy no longer contains any element of in-
surance. Instead, all returns by the isurance company then constitute accu-
mulated savings plus interest whether payable to the insured in a lump sum or
as a survivorship annuity.90 Thus, in a combination life insurance and annuity
plan, the pivotal point for differentiating between the two is the date at which
terminal reserve equals the face amount of the policy.91
Employee death benefits analyzed
A functional approach should govern estate taxation of employee death bene-
fits under sections 2039 and 2042.92 For the context of an employment relation-
ship does not alter the basic "insurance-savings" characteristics of death bene-
fits. This is most apparent when death benefit plans are obtained by the em-
ployer from an insurance company. To the extent the plans so provided are
purchased with contributions of the employer, they are, as between employer
and employee, simply compensation for the latter's services.9 3 But once respec-
the amount of liability at this point. See ACKFRMAN 71 (table) ; MEN.GE & GLOVER 136
(mathematical details) ; RIEGm & LOMAN 141.
88. The amount of premiums is computed to satisfy all obligations connected with the
policy including insured's share of group death claims, insurer expenses and the terminal
reserve figure or insurer liability at the policy's maturity. See RIEGEL & LOMAX 138; note
80 supra.
89. See note 74 supra and accompanying text; note 85 supra.
90. The obligations under the policy have been covered. The terminal reserve figure
equals the benefit which the insured will receive, and the insurer is no longer subject to
risk. Technically, "term insurance protection" has given way to a return of savings. See
MEHR & OSLER 45. See notes 74, 80, 82, 86-87 supra.
91. This method of distinction is crucial for estate taxation of employee death benefits.
See text at note 101 infra. But see text at notes 118-24 infra.
92. Although ambiguous, the estate tax regulations seem to adopt this method for dis-
tinguishing insurance from annuities, at least when death benefits are funded through a
standard insurance company. See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1 (d), (example),
21 FED. REG. 7877-78 (1956) ; note 101. infra and accompanying text.
93. The employer agrees to contribute toward retirement and death benefit plans in
lieu of higher wages. For the compensatory character of employer contributions to such
plans, see O'NULL 1-12; Bittker, Estate and Gift Taxation Under the 1954 Code: The
Principal Changes, 29 Tus.. L. REV. 453, 470 (1955). The compensatory nature of em-
ployer contributions is axiomatic in the case of deferred compensation contracts, which may
take the form of retirement death benefit plans. The main purpose of these plans is to
avoid progressive income tax rates applicable during productive years. Childs, Deferred
Compensation Plans for Executives, 31 TAXES 1007-08 (1953) ; Lefevre, Deferred Com-
pensation Plans, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1081, 1082-83 (1957) ; Rice, Incentives
for Executives of Small Corporations, 32 TAxEs 222, 225-26 (1.954).
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tive shares of the plan's cost are agreed upon, the employer, in so far as the
employee's contributions are concerned, is merely a conduit between the em-
ployee and the insurance company.94 Thus, if the employer procures protection
only against loss of earnings through premature death, each policy is in all
respects life insurance. 5 The employer's bargaining position as multiple pur-
chaser from the insurance company merely lessens the cost per policy without
affecting the functional character of the individual coverage. 0
More typically, employer and insurance company arrange combination retire-
ment and death benefit plans. 97 Often, such plans will shift from insurance to
savings within an employee's own lifetime, like the standard life insurance en-
dowment contract, raising similar problems of classification. In an employment
context, the pivotal point is ordinarily the date at which the employee expects
to retire.Ys If he dies prior to this date, named beneficiaries immediately receive
death benefits. Should retirement age be reached, the employee may elect to
94. If instead the employee received higher wages and purchased identical benefits
himself, estate taxation would apparently depend upon a functional analysis. See Proposed
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d), 21 FED. REG. 7877-78 (1956). See also note 101 infra.
Taxation is similarly determined when the employer, either alone or in conjunction with
his employees, purchases a retirement death benefit contract from a standard insurer. See
Proposed US. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d) (example), 21 FED. RE. 7878 (1956). But
when the employer pays death benefits directly, the functional analysis may not be used.
See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
95. The issue is not disputed. If only insurance benefits are provided and the contract
is purchased from an insurance company, the proceeds will be taxed under § 2042 whether
purchased by employees in an individual capacity or by the employer. See note 101 infra.
Serious estate tax problems arise only when the plan combines both insurance and annuity
features: i.e., when it resembles a standard life insurance endowment contract.
96. The cost of group life insurance per employee is significantly lower than the cost
of an individual policy. For this reason, group plans are an increasingly popular form of
insurance protection. See ALLEN 112-15; MEHR & OsLER 273-74; RIEGEL & LO-MAN 223-28.
97. DEARING 1-3; SiBsoN 9-14; CCH, PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS AND
CLAUSES 3 (1957). Many plans will also provide insurance protection for the employee
during the period of employment. Cardon, Taxation of Compensation, 6 J. TAXATION 100,
102 (1957). Combination insurance-annuity benefits are less common under qualified plans,
because qualified insurance is disfavored for income tax purposes, see note 17 supra, and
because the cost of insurance protection for a substantial percentage of employees may be
excessive, SIBSON 110. However, group term insurance may be carried in addition to
qualified benefits when desired. O'NEILL 320-22. Since non-qualified plans are frequently
designed to compensate key personnel, the additional cost is not a deterrent and combina-
tion insurance-annuity contracts are commonly used. See Lefevre, supra note 93, at 1095-
96; Cardon, supra at 102.
98. The regulations recognize the importance of the retirement date. See Proposed
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d) (example), 21 FED. REG. 7878 (1956). To illustrate, a
typical plan combining insurance protection purchased by the employer from an insurance
carrier is the group permanent life insurance contract. This arrangement provides insur-
ance protection prior to retirement., At retirement the insurance feature gives way to a
simple or survivorship annuity. MEHR & OsLER 306-09; WYATT 73-78; St. John, supra
note 47, at 116-23. If the number of employees within the plan is not of sufficient size to
obtain group coverage, similar provisions are commonly found in individual policies.
COuPER & VAUGHAN 47-48; St. John, supra note 47, at 128-31.
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receive any one of several kinds of annuity payments. The insurance com-
pany under tis type of arrangement will calculate premiums to yield an
amount at retirement sufficient to meet both the annuity then taking effect and
loss from unpaid premiums of similar policy holders expected to die premature-
ly within the same period. In other words, terminal reserve will equal face
amount at or near the specified retirement date.' 00 Contributions on behalf of
the insured thus defray the insurer's mortality costs as well as his future
obligations on the given policy. When at retirement both these costs are
met, the plan becomes an annuity. And the Commissioner has adopted this
analysis-based on the terminal reserve figure-for distinguishing insurance
from savings, at least when employee death benefits are, as here, purchased
from a standard insurance company.' 0 '
99. See id. at 119, 122. Such a plan is exactly analogous to a life insurance endow-
ment contract. See notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
100. Teyminal reserve will equal the face amount at retirement date if, as is frequently
the case, the present value of the annuity then taking effect is equal to the total amount
payable as insurance prior to retirement. See MEHR & OsLa 306-07. Often, however, the
plan will provide an annuity after retirement which will exceed the face amount payable
as insurance prior to retirement. This practice may reflect an employer's intention not to
compensate an employee fully unless all his services are in fact performed. In this event,
the terminal reserve value will exceed the face value of the insurance in the years im-
mediately preceeding retirement, since the insurer must collect the additional funds neces-
sary to meet the annuity coming due at retirement. But the date at which terminal reserve
equals face amount will nevertheless mark the expiration of the insurance feature for
estate tax purposes. See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d), (example), 21 FEP.
REG. 7877-78 (1956) ; notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text. If the employee dies after
the date at which terminal reserve equals face amount but before retirement, his benefi-
ciaries will receive the full value of the reserve, including its excess over face amount;
but this amount is functionally not insurance. See, generally, 2fEnR & OsLra 306-OS;
WYATT 74; St. John, supra note 47, at 119. And the terminal reserve will equal face value
only shortly before retirement, for the employee will want insurance protection during the
time he is most likely to die. See Wbid.
101. "If an annuity or other payment receivable by a beneficiary under a contract or
an agreement is in substance the proceeds of insurance under a policy on the life of
the decedent, section 2039(a) and (b) does not apply . . . [S]ee section 2042 and
§ 20.2042-1. A combination annuity contract and life insurance policy on the de-
cedent's life (e.g., a 'retirement income' policy with death benefits) which matured
during the decedent's life so that there was no longer an insurance element under
the contract at the time of the decedent's death is subject to the provision of section
2039(a) and (b). On the other hand, the treatment of a combination annuity con-
tract and life insurance policy on the decedent's life which did not mature during
the decedent's life depends upon the nature of the contract at the time of the de-
cedent's death. The nature of the contract is generally determined by the relation
of the terminal reserve value of the policy to the value of the death benefit at the
time of the decedent's death. If the decedent dies before the terminal reserve value
equals the death benefit, there is still an insurance element under the contract. The
contract is therefore considered, for estate tax purposes, to be an insurance policy
subject to the provisions of section 2042. However, if the decedent dies after the
terminal reserve value equals the death benefit, there is no longer an insurance
element under the contract. The contract is therefore considered to be a contract
1239
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But the functional analysis also seems appropriate when death benefits are
paid directly by the employer and not by a commercial insurance company. 102
The employer may himself finance any type of death benefit sold by an insur-
ance company, whether or not he utilizes the bookkeeping techniques of his
for an annuity or other payment subject to the provisions of section 2039(a) and
(b) or some other provision of sections 2033 through 2041 ....
Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1 (d), 21 FED. REG. 7877-78 (1956). The example is
given of a combination retirement-death benefit plan which shifts from insurance to an
annuity at the retirement date, the terminal reserve then equalling face value by hypothesis.
Id. example 1,
However, a different analysis is applied for the income taxation of insurance benefits
under qualified plans. For purposes of § 101 (a) ('1), the terminal reserve value of a policy
is denied recognition as "insurance." Instead, only the amount at risk when the insured
dies is treated as insurance: i.e., the difference between the total amount collected from
the insurer less the value of the terminal reserve. The terminal reserve yalue is taxed as
the refund portion of an annuity under § 402(a). The "insurance" portion--amount at
risk-is tax exempt under § 101 (a) (1). As the reserve builds up over the period of em-
ployment, the amount at risk necessarily decreases. The "insurance" portion thus varies
inversely with the length of service for this limited purpose. See U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402
(a)-1(a) (3), (4) (1956).
This approach has never been employed or argued for estate tax purposes. But cf.
Kernochan v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 507, 29 F. Supp. 860 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
675 (1940) ; Estate of Benton L. Snyder, 4 OCH Tax Ct. Mem. 957 (1945), discussed at
note 114 infra; Estate of Stuart Wilson, 42 B.T.A. 11.96 (1940). Ordinarily, if any amount
is at risk, the entire proceeds of a standard insurance policy are subject to estate taxation
as "insurance" under § 2042, including the full value of the terminal reserve. Only when
the terminal reserve equals the face amount and there is no further risk will the proceeds
not be taxed as insurance. Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d), 21 FaD. RMc. 7877-
78 (1956). See, generally, Lawthers, The Individual Life Insurance Policy Issiled in Col-
nection with a Qualified Employee Trust, 35 TAxEs 173 (1957). The estate tax analysis
which considers terminal reserve value as a part of the insurance proceeds is consonant
with customary insurer practices and the traditional definition of insurance established in
Helvering v. Le Gierse. See text at notes 73-82 supra. This is particularly true since, as
a practical matter, the "terminal reserve value" is insurance from the insured's point of
view, for he can obtain this sum on surrendering the policy only by forfeiting protection
against premature death. See note 80 supra. The income tax approach is deviational, made
necessary by the Code's peculiar, over-all tax scheme for qualified plans, and in that con-
text, may prevent tax avoidance. See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1A02(a)-i (a) (1956), interpret-
ing INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a) (taxability of beneficiary of a qualified trust).
A distinction betveen the amount at risk and the terminal reserve value should not be
allowed under the estate tax even if argued. Besides distorting the realities of insurer
practices, such an approach would create confusion and thwart congressional intent. For
the terminal reserve value would not be taxable as insurance under § 2042, but only under
other provisions. And when a combination life insurance-annuity contract is involved, both
§§ 2039 and 2042 would be concurrently applicable to the respective portions of "risk" and
"savings" in the proceeds, if terminal reserve did not equal face amount when the insured
died. Such difficulties would be compounded if an employer paid the benefits directly with-
out the aid of an insurance company, since the vital actuarial computations might be lack-
ing. Manifestly, this is not the approach Congress envisioned in passing § 2042 which
reaches simply the proceeds of "life insurance."
102. Death benefit plans are either employer self-funded or financed through an in-
surance company, unless the arrangement is completely informal. See note 47 supra. It is
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professional counterpart. 10 3 Since employee death benefits represent compen-
sation in so far as employer contributions are concerned, the employee's services
must, to that extent, earn the necessary "premiums" before maturity. The
employer's computation of "face amount" is therefore geared to the expected
period of service.104 Accordingly, an employer providing the typical combina-
tion retirement and death benefit plan would, upon an employee's death prior
to retirement age, pay a death benefit exceeding the premiums earned through
services actually performed. 1 5 In this context, the plan resembles insurance.
likely that smaller firms will choose a formal plan with a commercial carrier rather than
self-funding, because smaller enterprises risk loss from failure to realize actuarial predic-
tions and from high administrative costs per employee. See SinsoN 18; Gordon, Pension
and Profit Sharing Plans for Medium and Small Business, 1955 TULANE TAX INsT. 231,
240-41; Loschen, Accounting Aspects of Self Insurance Programs, 99 J. ACCOUNTANCY
Jan. 1955, p. 50.
An informal, non-funded plan is sometimes no plan at all. The benefits are paid out of
general funds, and the employee may have no contractual assurance that he will receive
anything. See CoUi'a & VAUGHAN 27-29; MaaR & OsLER 294; O'NEILL 32-37; SmBsoN
18-20. But if the primary purpose of the plan is compensation of top executives or other
key personnel, an informal, non-funded plan is often used. The employer's obligation is
then fairly definite, though the employee's interest is usually forfeitable. See note 26 supra.
And under a non-funded plan, the employer is generally entitled to an income tax deduc-
tion in the years when compensation is paid, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (5) ; U.S.
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1957) ; see also Lefevre, supra note 93, at 1094-98, while con-
tributions to a funded plan favoring key employees may never be deductible. For such
contributions are deductible only if the plan qualifies under § 401. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 404(a) (2). And a plan discriminating in favor of key employees cannot qualify.
Note 12 supra.
103. If the plan is self-funded, the services of an actuary are commonly employed.
O'NEILL 174-75; SIBsox 20-21. It does not necessarily follow that self-funding employers
will make conservative estimates based on sound mortality and interest assumptions when
computing the cost of their obligations. In fact, there may be a tendency to underestimate
costs, since liabilities will be minimal in early years. See MER & OsLER 295. Generally,
however, an employer will attempt to approximate the actuarial computations of a standard
insurer, in order that his contributions will be just sufficient to cover all future obligations.
The more formal, conscientious and well organized the self-funded plan, the more closely
the employer's methodology will resemble that of a miniature insurance company.
On the other hand, if the plan is on an informal or pay-as-you-go basis, it is unlikely
that the employer will rely on actuarial principles in the manner of a standard insurer.
'See SiBsoN 19; O'NEmL 35-37. These employers are more interested in deferred compen-
sation than the mechanics of risk shifting; any "loss" thus occasioned is merely compen-
sation which the employer expects to pay in any event. Nevertheless, even such informal
payments may functionally correspond to the payments of a more formal operation for
estate tax purposes. See text at notes 121-24 infra.
104. The employee's services correspond to the payment of premiums. Otherwise the
employer may encounter higher costs than the value of the employee's services warrant.
In some cases, however, the employee may continue employment in an advisory capacity
after "retirement." The value of post-retirement services could be included in computing
the costs of insurance protection. But generally retention in such capacity would not affect
the employer's calculations, and should not be significant for estate tax purposes. See note
124 infra.
105. An employer would rarely provide pure insurance with no lifetime feature with-
out the aid of an insurance company, cf. Loschen, supra note 102, at 50, and thus will more
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After retirement, on the other hand, the death benefit would probably repre-
sent merely a return of the employee's accrued earnings.10 6 Within this frame-
work, the employer's administration of his plan may more or less parallel the
operations of a commercial insurer, depending on his objectives.,0 7 Actuarial
principles may be utilized.'0 8 For example, the "face amount" of the death
benefit may take into account interest to accrue upon the employee's earnings
between his retirement and expected date of death. 10 9 Upon premature death,
a beneficiary would then receive unearned interest as well as unearned compen-
sation.110 Conversely, long-lived employees would defray loss from premature
death, since their earnings would contribute unexpected interest to the em-
ployer.11l Moreover, the employer can even duplicate the insurer's "terminal
reserve" operation by deducting actuarially predicted mortality costs from pro-
jected earnings. In this manner, risk can be spread among all participating
employees, though actuarial calculations are necessarily less certain due to the
small sampling of individuals involved. 1 2 But such intricate calculations are
probably combine retirement income with death benefits. As compensation, such plans re-
ward the employee after his services have been rendered. Nevertheless, some insurance
against premature death prior to retirement is likely to be included, although the benefits
payable before that date may be less than the amount due thereafter. This is often the
case when commercial insurance contracts are used. See notes 98, 100 supra.
106. Retirement in a death benefit-retirement plan is analogous to the maturity date
of a life insurance endowment contract. At maturity, all future benefits will have been
paid by past premiums and the annuity feature commences. Similarly, by retirement, the
employee will have earned all contributions on his behalf through past services, see note
104 supra, and he is then entitled to receive retirement or other benefits. As in the life in-
surance endowment contract, the insurance risk ceases when the retirement death benefits
have been earned in full by past services. At this point, the employee is no longer shifting
risk of premature death, for the payments merely represent accumulated, accrued earnings
which he has deferred until retirement.
107. See note 103 supra.
108. The employer's calculations may include mortality and interest assumptions, in
addition to the value of the employee's services. For other pertinent factors, see O'NEILU
75-89; note 103 supra.
109. If the employer systematically allocates funds to meet costs over the period of
anticipated employment, interest will be earned throughout that period. Conceptually, this
is true even if the plan is non-funded, for the employer will be using the funds within the
enterprise and thereby earning "interest." See notes 75, 76 supra. But if the funds are not
segregated, interest assumptions become highly conjectural, since the "interest rate" would
vary with the success of the enterprise.
110. The amount of contributions on behalf of an employee, plus interest, should equal
the total payable benefits at the expected date of his death. Although all contributions will
generally have been made before retirement, if the employee dies prematurely, but after
retirement, the benefits payable must include the interest that would have been earned had
the employee survived to his life expectancy.
111. If the employee elects a simple or survivorship annuity, the employer retains por-
tions of the principal for a longer period. The amount paid should thus include interest
earned while the principal is retained. For an example of typical options available at re-
tirement, see Knight v. Finnegan, 74 F. Supp. 900, 901 & n.2 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
112. The actuarial sampling is necessarily smaller in the case of a self-insurer. The
smaller the sample, the less are the chances of realizing actuarial predictions. Even the
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not essential. For the employer can more easily provide informal insurance
protection by merely agreeing to pay a sum upon the employee's untimely death
which will exceed to some extent the amount of earnings to be allocated for
this purpose over the employment period. True, the employer would have to
assume loss occasioned by premature deaths as a cost of the enterprise. And
such loss would be distributed among the employer's customers rather than the
insured group. While the employer may thus not distribute loss as success-
fully as an insurance company, he nevertheless protects his employees against
loss of earnings through untimely death.113 From the latter's viewpoint, there-
fore, the precise functions of insurance are fulfilled. Consequently, the reluc-
tance of the Commissioner and the courts to classify employer-paid benefits as
insurance seems unwarranted."14
On the other hand, arguments supporting this attitude can be advanced. First,
the language of section 2042 itself may exclude contracts not issued by a stand-
most careful calculations may thus not reflect the actual costs of the protection provided.
When cost is underestimated, the employer must make up the difference out of general
funds. This fact may lead an employer to abandon strict actuarial principles, especially
where "loss" is merely deferred compensation he expects to pay. See note 103 supra. Or
it may be desirable for the smaller company to adopt a plan issued by a standard insurer.
SiasoN 18; Gordon, supra note 102, at 241 n.24.
113. Loss from premature death is shifted to the employer's enterprise. The employer
distributes this loss among his customers via the price of his products. An insurance com-
pany distributes loss among its customers via the price of the policies issued. "Risk shift-
ing" and "risk distributing" are the hallmarks of insurance. See text at note 73 supra.
Nevertheless, the absence of a formal mechanism for risk shifting and risk distributing
does not affect the functional character of the benefits paid. If at death the employee re-
ceives more than his services have earned, the death benefits are insurance: loss from
premature death is shifted to the enterprise and thereby distributed. And such insurance
will generally expire at retirement, for benefits paid thereafter will represent accumulated
earnings over the period of service.
114. For discussion of the ambiguities in the regulations, see text at notes 48-49 upra.
A major source of confusion is in the congressional reports of the 1954 Code, which seem
to perpetuate the distinction between death benefits paid by the employer and those financed
through an insurance company. The following example of an employer financed "annuity"
taxable under § 2039 appears in S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954) and H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A315 (1954).
"(4) A contract or agreement entered into by the decedent and his employer under
which at decedent's death, prior to retirement or prior to the expiration of a stated
period of time, an annuity or other payment was payable to a designated beneficiary
if surviving the decedent."
The benefits depicted in the ex\ample may functionally confer insurance protection in addi-
tion to constituting an annuity. For were the employee to purchase identical benefits from
an insurance company, the benefits would be considered term insurance if the insured by
dying prior to retirement or prior to a stated period of time could receive more than the
premiums paid to the date of death less mortality costs. See text at notes 78-82 supra. Of
course, the language employed in the example is ambiguous, and open to different inter-
pretations. For instance, if the plan illustrated merely returns premiums in the event of
premature death, as in a refund annuity, the benefits are not functionally insurance. See
text at notes 83-85 supra. But many plans do provide insurance protection prior to retire-
ment. See notes 97 supra, 122 infra. To the extent that this fact is recognized and incor-
1957] 1243
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ard insurance company, since it purports to reach only insurance proceeds
receivable under "policies."" 5 But this technical construction is not convinc-
ing in view of the senseless consequences to both qualified and non-qualified
plans it produces.: 6 Instead, the customary interpretation that the word
"policy" under section 2042 encompasses any contract or agreement perform-
ing the function of insurance seems preferable."1 7 A more persuasive argu-
ment against treating direct employer payments as insurance can be premised
on the fact that only insurance companies usually maintain a working terminal
reserve figure for each policy issued. On this view, courts are unable to patrol
the line between insurance and savings absent a terminal reserve figure "--a
porated by the example, it implicitly excludes employer-financed insurance from § 2042
and requires its taxation under § 2039.
The language of the congressional example is so ambiguous, however, that doubt exists
as to whether the benefits depicted would in any event be subject to § 2039 itself. Lacking
an explicit lifetime feature, unless the example is interpreted to imply such a provision
or is read in conjunction with other examples which do so provide, it may be irreconcilable
with the language of § 2039. See Bittker, Estate and Gift Taxation under the 1954 Code:
The Principal Changes, 29 TUL. L. REv. 453, 469 & n.58 ('1955) ; Note, 6 STAN. L. Riiv.
473, 487-89 (1.954) ; 3 RIA, FaD. TAX COORDINATOR R-4406. At least one author suggests
that the employee's salary fulfills this requirement, and that the example is in this way
consistent with the statute. See Pyle, Income, Estate and Gift Taxation of Life, Accident
and Sickness Insurance and Annuities under the 1954 Code, 1956 Tur. TAX INsT. 467,
654-55. In any event, the example denies "insurance" recognition to benefits functionally
insurance so long as it can be assumed that the employee's premature death would result
in a payment to his beneficiaries exceeding the value of his contributions. See note 48
supra. The case law may be interpreted to approve classification of employer insurance
payments as "insurance." See Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950). See also Kernochan v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 507, 29 F.
Supp. 860 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 675 (1940) ; Estate of Benton L. Snyder, 4 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 957 (1945) ; Estate of Stuart Wilson, 42 B.T.A. 1196 (1940). The three latter
cases involved New York City employee retirement systems which provided an amount
approximately equal to one year's salary plus a return of contributions to the beneficiary
of an employee dying prior to retirement. Employees living to retirement age received
an annuity for life or any of the typical annuity options. The courts correctly held the
one year salary amount to be insurance, despite the absence of a commercial contract. But
contributions refunded in conjunction with the salary payment were denied classification
as insurance. To the extent that both employee contributions and posthumous salary were
integral parts of one arrangement, this result seems incorrect. See Helvering v. Le Gierse,
312 U.S. 531 (1941). The total proceeds would appear more properly classifiable as in-
surance. See note 101 supra.
115. See note 34 sapra.
116. Non-qualified employer-financed insurance would be taxed according to the stricter
contribution test of § 2039 rather than the control test of § 2042. See text at notes 22-24
supra. Qualified insurance proceeds would receive immunity not available if paid under a
commercial policy. See text at notes 54-55 supra. These consequences are haphazard and
without policy justification.
117. Insurance contracts issued by fraternal societies are currently within § 2042. See
Proposed US. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a), 21 FED. REG. 7885 (1956). See also 2 BEVEMDGE
§ 11.02; LOWNDES & KRAxER 290-93; 3 RIA, FED. TAX COODINATOR R-4015.
118. The regulations emphasize that annuities and insurance are distinguishable by the
relation of the policy's terminal reserve to face amount at death. Proposed U.S. Treas.
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disability which enables employers to confer maximum estate tax advantages by
juggling the character of a plan as the need arises. 119 The possibilities for
maneuvering are real, since for purposes of sections 2039 and 2042, the same
plan may be insurance or annuity at different times.120
Nevertheless, absence of a terminal reserve computation should not of itself
preclude classifying death benefits as insurance. In effect, refusing insurance
classification would conclusively presume all employer-paid benefits to be mere-
ly returned earnings.1 2 1 Yet, from the employee's perspective, death benefits
are often attractive precisely because they assure his beneficiaries of an amount
exceeding earnings in the event of premature death. And when the employer's
plan is designed to compensate key executives and others for whom the estate
tax is relevant, insurance type benefits are especially likely.' 22 These benefits
should not receive inconsistent tax treatment merely because sections 2039 and
2042 are less conveniently differentiated absent a formal terminal reserve figure.
Reg. § 20.2039-1(d), 21. FED. RFG. 7877-78 (1956). When the actuarial data from which
"terminal reserve" is calculated are lacking, the Commissioner's basis for distinction is
non-existent. Although not expressly stated in case law or regulations, it is likely that the
absence of terminal reserve data accounts for the reluctance to categorize benefits as "in-
surance" when not paid by a standard insurer.
119. For example, the employer might arrange to provide death benefits always in
excess of a putative "terminal reserve." If employees divest themselves of control, such
benefits would pass free of the estate tax, assuming the "insurance" category of § 2042
were continually applicable. See text at notes 34-38 supra. This manipulation would also
benefit the employer, since the net contributions necessary to provide a tax free benefit
would be less than the amount needed to produce the same benefit after taxes. The regu-
lations anticipate tax avoidance by means of terminal reserve manipulation:
"Notwithstanding the relation of the terminal reserve value of the death benefit, a
contract under which the death benefit could never exceed the total premiums paid,
plus interest, contains no insurance element."
Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d), 21 FaD. REG. 7877-78 (1956). Nevertheless,
detecting the strategem from the books of a private company would prove a formidable
obstacle.
120. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
121. The classification is crucial, since if the employee possessed any right to receive
payment during his life, the death benefits will generally be taxable under § 2039 when
not taxable under § 2042. See notes 14, 22-24 supra and accompanying text. There are a
few exceptions taxable under neither section. See text at note 57 supra. But, in contrast
with § 2042, the liability of § 2039 is -not easily avoided. See text at notes 22-24 supra.
And most death benefits-whether employer or commercially operated-will in fact confer
upon the employee a right to payment during life. See authorities cited note 97 supra.
Accordingly, denial of "insurance" status to employer-paid benefits has serious tax dis-
advantages for the employee and his beneficiaries. Some employees participating in quali-
fied plans would, however, benefit from this treatment. See text at notes 54-55 supra.
122. See note 20 supra. The families of high income employees stand to lose heavily
upon premature death of the wage earner. And the high incidence of early death among
corporate executives and others similarly situated is notorious. For these reasons, high
income employees particularly welcome protection against premature death. While em-
ployers may understandably be unwilling to confer as large a death benefit before retire-
ment as after, see note 100 supra, insurance benefits for executives and others will never-
theless be substantial.
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Instead, sounder approach would counteract the absence of terminal reserve by
evaluating direct employer-payment plans in terms of the recurring character-
istics of standard plans sold by insurance companies. Thus, when the employer's
plan provides no retirement or other life time feature, death benefits should be
presumed insurance unless the Commissioner proves otherwise. In rebuttal,
the Commissioner might show that the plan returned deferred savings with
no element of risk shifting or distributing, or that when benefits were paid, the
employee's earnings or contributions on his behalf already covered the costs of
risk distribution as well as the face amount.123 Similarly, when employer-
operated plans embody retirement features, death benefits should be presumed
insurance prior to retirement and savings thereafter, again subject to a con-
trary showing by the employee's estate. 12 4 These presumptions would minimize
123. Of course, mortality distribution may not be used when the employer pays bene-
fits directly. And the information necessary to prove that such costs had already been
defrayed, or that merely deferred earnings were returned, would be difficult for the Com-
missioner to obtain. Nevertheless, prior to retirement, direct employer death benefits most
likely do return some unearned compensation and are therefore functionally insurance.
Correlating their tax treatment with that afforded commercial contracts would accordingly
seem proper.
124. When a combination retirement-death benefit plan which includes insurance cover-
age is purchased from an insurance company, terminal reserve will equal face amount at
or near the retirement date. See note 100 supra. This date is similarly emphasized by the
regulations. See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1 (d) (example), 21 FED. REG. 7877-
78 (1956). The presumption accords factually with most arrangements. See note 100 .supra.
Often, however, plans will require the employee to remain with the enterprise in an ad-
visory capacity after retirement as a condition to receiving death benefits. Where the plan
is intended to defer income, such a condition is especially desirable for income tax pur-
poses. See Lefevre, supra note 93, at 1086-89; Allison, Deferred Compensation of Execu-
tives, 1954 Tm.. TAx IN ST. 105, 119-21. See also note 26 supra. The existence of such a
condition gives rise to the argument that death benefits paid after retirement also include
unearned compensation, since the employee's consultation services would presumably be
included when computing the cost and amount of death benefits he will receive. This argu-
ment, if successful, would result in § 2042 coverage for benefits paid after retirement. But
the contractual obligation to serve as consultant after retirement is a poor guide for dis-
tinguishing between insurance and annuities. For the consultation provision is actually a
polite form of retirement, and the condition itself is used primarily for its income tax
advantages. See note 26 supra. Accordingly, the presence of this condition should be dis-
regarded for estate tax purposes, and the retirement date should constitute the pivotal
point for distinguishing between § 2039 and § 2042 when the employer pays benefits
directly.
Use of the retirement date as the distinguishing factor may, however, occasion some
tax loss for the Commissioner. Frequently, combination insurance-annuity contracts pur-
chased from an insurance company shift from insurance to annuity somewhat earlier than
the retirement date. See note 100 supra. Since terminal reserve equals face amount at the
date when the shift occurs, the Commissioner can easily detect the expiration of the insur-
ance feature. When, however, a similar plan is financed directly by the employer without
use of an insurance company, it would be difficult for the Commissioner to prove that the
benefit was "paid up?' prior to retirement. Consequently, some employees dying shortly
before retirement would, under the suggested presumption, receive § 2042 treatment even
though technically the insurance feature may have expired. Nevertheless, absorbing this
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tax avoidance potential by restricting the opportunities for manipulating death
benefit plans after the death of a participating employee, and encourage em-
ployers to adopt bookkeeping techniques comparable to the terminal reserve
method when aberrational benefits are provided.1 25 In this manner, the charac-
teristics of standard plans sold by insurance companies can be used to avoid
arbitrary tax results which follow when direct employer benefits are denied
recognition as insurance within section 2042.126
The Functional Approach and the Anomalous Category
Use of a functional analysis would also prevent certain employer-paid bene-
fits from escaping taxation. The area beyond sections 2039 and 2042 may in-
clude a limited number of non-qualified, employer-paid insurance benefits which
would fall within section 2042 but for the restrictive definition of insurance. 27
Absent a lifetime feature, these benefits cannot be reached as annuities under
section 2039. Unless the Commissioner accepts a functional definition of in-
surance, they will occupy a third area and may be sheltered from taxation by
the semantic technicalities attending application of the terms "property" and
"transfer." Ioreover, these technicalities have improperly determined estate tax
treatment of employee death benefits in that area.1 28 For considering the em-
slight tax loss seems preferable to denying arbitrarily all employer-paid insurance the
advantages of § 2042. Moreover, use of the retirement date presumption is desirable be-
cause it provides a workable approach to taxation of employer-paid benefits consistent
with the tax treatment of commercial plans and the over-all scheme of §§ 2039 and 2042.
125. Employers wishing to extend insurance coverage beyond retirement would for-
malize their computations in order to prove that the benefits were not previously earned
or "paid up."
126. Even apart from tax avoidance problems, the suggested presumptions are desir-
able. The "terminal reserve" concept relied on by the Commissioner for distinguishing
between § 2039 and § 2042 is merely a matter of administrative convenience necessitated
by the statutory differentiation of "annuities" and "insurance." It is no more or less than
a technical bookkeeping device useful in the insurance business for purely professional
reasons. Convenience does not necessarily make sound tax policy. The mere absence of
terminal reserve from employer-paid benefits should not justify a treatment of these plans
inconsistent with others that provide functionally identical benefits. The fault, if any,
lies with the statutory distinction which makes the task necessary and not with the tax-
payer. In the interest of predictable and consistent tax results, therefore, the presumptions
seem preferable to sui generis treatment of employer-paid benefits.
127. See note 48 supra.
128. See text at notes 59-71 supra. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the
mere possibility of an employer terminating a plan does not indicate the absence of a
"property" interest and has recommended that the Dimock v. Corwin line of cases, note
64 supra, no longer be followed. G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 Cmrm. BuLL. 160. See LOWNDFS &
K.AER 51-52, 156; Note, 6 STAN. L. REv. 473 (1954). But see Molter v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Nelson, The New 85,000 Death Benefit, 31
TAXEs 629, 632 (1953). Moreover, commentators have suggested that decisions which
fail to find a "transfer" or a "transferor" are unreal. See LOWNDEs & KRAmER 156-57;
Note, 6 STAN. L. REv. 473, 478 (1954).
Reliance on technical distinctions is particularly harmful in this area, since the eni-
ployer's payments may escape taxation altogether. The gift tax is inapplicable, since the
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ployee's "expectation" at death less than a property right is unrealistic. 109 Al-
though an employer may theoretically forfeit death benefits, employee pressures
restrict the exercise of such power. 130 And conditions of forfeiture are often
sham, primarily concocted for tax advantages. 131 More accurately, therefore,
the employee's right vests when the plan is established, subject only to divest-
ment before death.' 32 Similarly, the "transferor" requirement is unpersuasive.
The employee is no less the economic source of the benefits when the employer
names beneficiaries than when the appointment is his own. In both cases the
benefits represent compensation to the employee, and the transfer is effectuated
by performance of his services.133
Because employee death benefits in this area are in principle the same as
those taxed by sections 2039 and 2042, precedents enabling them to escape
taxation should be overruled.13 4 Since these benefits are clearly without life-
time features, taxation should resemble current treatment of insurance: reten-
tion of control over proceeds at death portends tax liability. Employees willing
to divest themselves of control more than three years before death would con-
tinue to avoid taxation, just as owners of interests in insurance may avoid lia-
bility under section 2042.135 Overruling precedents entangled in property law
refinements would, of course, have the further advantage of eliminating the
anomalous juxtaposition of property law with contributions and control as the
basis for estate taxation of employee death benefits.
same problems of "property" and "transfer" prevent its imposition. See INT. REV. CODE
oF 1954, §§ 2501, 2511. And the context of an employee-employer relationship makes it doubt-
ful that payments would be "gifts."
129. This is the position taken by the Internal Revenue Service. See authorities cited
note 128 supra.
130. "[E]conomic and moral pressures... as a practical matter preclude the revocation
of the plan ...." and unfavorable modifications of the plan by the employer would be
"... so certain to meet with powerful employee opposition .... that employers may find
them virtually impossible to carry out." LOWNDES & KRAMER 51-52, 156. See also Note,
6 STAN. L. REv. 473, 479 (1954).
131. See notes 3, 26 supra.
If the possibilities of forfeiture are real, one approach might be to consider the con-
tingencies in the valuation of benefits, rather than holding the interest a "mere expectancy."
See Childs, Deferred Compensation Plais for Executives, 31 TAXES 1007, 1020 (1953) ;
Note, 6 STAN. L. REv. 473, 479 (1954). But a recent decision held that the possibilities of
forfeiture rendered decedent's right to receive $6,000 per year for fifteen years valueless
since the benefit had no fair market value. Goodman v. Granger, 56-1 U.S.T.C. 1 11595
(W.D. Pa. 1956), rev'd on other gronds, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957).
132. !See Estate of Albert B. King, 20 T.C. 930 (1953). Apparently the Tax Court
regarded the forfeiture provisions as a condition subsequent. The decedent was held to
have a vested property interest not made contingent by the mere possibility of divestment.
Thus, the entire amount credited to decedent's account was included in his gross estate.
It has been suggested that this case may open up a wide vista for the Commissioner to
strike down conditions. Childs, supra note 131, at 1019-20.
133. See notes 28, 30 supra.
134. See authorities cited notes 28, 30 supra.
135. See text at notes 34-38 supra. By making the transfer more than three years
prior to death, the employee would escape taxation as a transfer in contemplation of death.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
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THE BROADER PERSPECTIVE: CONSISTENCY NEEDED
The divergent treatment accorded employee death benefits reflects a basic
equivocation in the estate tax. Three different approaches yielding widely dis-
similar results are presently utilized. If death benefits are considered insurance
within section 2042, the proceeds are includible in the employee's gross estate
only if at death he controlled their disposition. If, however, the annuity classi-
fication of section 2039 is applicable, the employee's gross estate includes bene-
fits attributable to. contributions irrespective of control. Death benefits
falling within neither category will at worst be subject to a control test
similar to that of section 2042, and if current case law is not overruled, may in
some instances be completely immune from estate taxation regardless of con-
trol or contributions. Adding to this confusion is the special category of "quali-
fied plans" which specifically exempts some annuities from taxation, but no
insurance proceeds.
From a policy perspective little justification for these conflicting principles
appears. Although insurance anid annuities functionally differ, this distinction
bears no discernible relationship to any rationale that might underlie an estate
tax. On the contrary, the distinction between annuity and insurance is most
often a matter of time and chance. Before the terminal reserve value or some
equivalent equals the face amount of a policy, the employee may possess in-
surance ; thereafter, the proceeds constitute an annuity or other form of savings.
Yet, this difference is essentially the employee's gamble on his own life; if death
is premature, the bet is won, while it is lost if he is long-lived. Certainly, the
incidence of estate taxation should not be predicated upon the success of a
gamble. And the distinction is entirely without genuine significance when lia-
bility for insurance but not "annuities" is avoidable by divestment of control.
An acute need thus exists for correlating various provisions of the Code into
a uniform scheme for estate taxation of employee death benefits. Reform should
extend to both qualified and non-qualified plans. The advantages of a qualified
plan should be made available for insurance proceeds payable under a plan
which otherwise meets the requirements of section 401. To the extent that
section 2039(c) validly exempts qualifying annuities, discrimination against
insurance proceeds under similar plans is unwarranted. For non-qualified plans,
a single principle of taxation should be chosen. If control is considered the
better approach, liability under section 2039 should be placed upon the same
footing. If the contribution method is preferred, something like the premium-
paid test must be reintroduced for insurance into section 2042.136 In either
136. After long history of vacillation, the premium payment test was abandoned in
1954 because "no other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent initially pur-
chased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to the proferty." H.R. REP,.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954). The repeal, however, met vigorous dissent: "But
life insurance is not like other property. It is inherently testamentary in nature .... We
predict that if this provision becomes law, it will virtually do away with estate taxation
of life insurance . . ." id. B14 (minority report) ; and a recent bill would reintroduce
the premium payment test on a limited scale, see note 34 supra. For an illuminating dis-
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case, the scope of both sections should be expanded to encompass those death
benefits now occupying an independent position, closing the loopholes presently
available for some plans. Which of these conflicting principles of taxation
should ultimately govern is debatable. The need for consistent estate tax treat-
ment of employee death benefits is beyond question.
cussion of the merits of various principles for the taxation of life insurance, see 32 AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 101-20 (1955), reprinted in WAaR & SuRRm 513-27.
Although the repeal has been criticized, it has been suggested that if the decedent
divested control during life, the premium payment test imposed an inequitable burden since
the assignee could at any time surrender the policy. See WARREN & SUaRY 528. Con-
sequently, when the decedent divested control, the premium payment test could equitably
be applied only to the difference between the cash surrender value and the face amount
payable at death. See ibid.; LowNDEs & KRAMER 281. But the premium payment test may
be justified. Inter vivos assignment, even if without the three-year limitation, can be
likened to a gift in contemplation of death. See WARaEN & SuRvY 529.
